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CAN THIS CULTUREBE SAVED? ANOTHER AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION BABYREFLECTSON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION. By Stephen L. Carter. New
York: Basic Books, 1993. Pp. 328. $25.00.
W Burlette Carter*
Trading on a number of attractive myths, in the fall of 1993, Stephen
Carter' produced one of the more celebrated books written by a law professor in recent memory. In The Culture of Disbelief, Carter charges the
American legal and political culture with trivializing religious devotion to
such an extent that today, religion is not an acceptable subject of discussion in public fora.2 Accordingly, says Carter, religious discourse is discouraged in public discussions while other types of discourse are welcomed, and religious behavior in public life is viewed as suspect becauseit
is religious.
The award-winning book generated a virtual cottage industry of news
articles and other media coverage on its subject.3 Shortly after Culture's
* Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University National Law
Center, B.A. Agnes Scott College, 1982; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1985. I thank my
colleagues Paul Butler, Brad Clark, Ira Lupu (special thanks), Larry Mitchell, and Robert
Tuttle who reviewed early drafts of this Review essay and provided helpful comments. I
also thank Dean Jack Friedenthal for his support, Professors Ronald Collins and Susan
Gilles for their insightful comments on an early draft, and Philip Davis for his help with
religious sources. Finally, I thank research assistants Carol Lillienstein and RobertJenkins,
who provided primary assistance with this work, as well as research assistants Mamaye
Makalou and James Hwa for their contributions.
(The author of this piece is not related to Stephen Carter.)
1. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University. Carter is also the
author of Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby (1991).
2. Some of the basic themes Carter trumpets in Culturehave been previously explored
by him in other publications and speeches. He notes in his acknowledgements two articles
in particular: Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 Duke
L.J. 977 (pp. vi, vii); The Inaugural Development Fund Lectures: Scientific Liberalism,
Scientistic Law, 69 Or. L. Rev. 471 (1990). See also Stephen L. Carter, The Separation of
Church and Self, 46 SMU L. Rev. 585 (1992) (arguing that liberal political theory's image
of ideal public citizen fails to preserve place for religious expressions); Stephen L. Carter,
Religion Doesn't Have a Prayer, Legal Times, July 23, 1990, at 28 (arguing that, according
to courts, the Establishment Clause mandates that "God's word may not be taken seriously
in public affairs"). Because Culture's primary readership-the
not
general public-does
have the benefit of Carter's prior works, and because Carter himself describes these earlier
explorations as part of an "intellectual odyssey" (p. vi) (thus suggesting that Culture
represents the most current manifestation of his views), my comments here are based
solely upon Culture of Disbelief unless otherwise stated. In making these comments, I take
into account the fact that a book for the general public does not lend itself to the same
degree of thoroughness allowable in a law review publication.
3. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Conservatives' Faith, Liberals' Disdain, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 15, 1993, ? 4, at 15 (book excerpt); Stephen L. Carter, Is God Just A Hobby?, Atlanta
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release, political and religious leaders across the country took to citing it
from platforms or waving it from pulpits. Indeed, President Clinton publicly praised Cultureas recommended reading4 and chose to have himself
depicted in a portrait holding a copy of the book.5 Culturewas widely
acclaimed as a significant contribution to our understanding of religion
in America.6 With few exceptions,7 the public responses to the book were
positive.
This Review is more critical of Culture'sapproach. I contend that
Culture'strivialization thesis lacks support and is inherently defective as a
starting point from which to fashion a workable theory of freedom to
engage in public religion. I argue that Culture'sapproach does not adequately consider minority group religious freedom rights. Moreover, it
yields to the inevitable search for audience appeal, Cultureends up trivializing the very religious concerns that it set out to highlight.
Part I provides a basic outline of the trivialization theory. Part II
examines some of the evidence that Carter presents to support this thesis,
focusing primarily on his argument that the law trivializes religion. There
I argue that Cultureexaggerates the examples of alleged trivialization that
it provides. Relying heavily upon overstatement, Cultureperpetuates a
mythology of oppression and undermines its primary objective of establishing that religious points of view should be taken seriously in public
debates.
Const., Oct. 17, 1993, at GI, G3 (book excerpt); Joel Chineson, Do You Believe in GodTalk?, Legal Times, Feb. 21, 1994, at 50; Joel Chineson, The Politics of Enlightenment,
Am. Law., May 1994, at 46.
4. See, e.g., David Lauter, Clinton Voices Concern U.S. May Be Too Secular, L.A.
Times, Aug. 31, 1993, at Al, A4; Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1993, at 8.
Both the President and Mrs.Clinton are mentioned favorablyin Culture(pp. 4-5, 19, 265).
5. This fact is noted by Sanford Levinson in his review of Culture. See Sanford
Levinson,The Multiculturesof Belief and Disbelief, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1873, 1873 n.3 (1994)
(citing David Bollier, Who "Owns"the Life of the Spirit?,Tikkun,Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 29).
6. In June of 1994, Carterwas awardedthe LouisvilleGrawemeyerAwardin Religion
for Culture.He was reportedly the first nontheologian to win the prestigious award. See
Judith L. Howard, Stephen L. Carter, Dallas Morning News, June 12, 1994, at 1J. The
following month the American Bar Association awardeda Certificateof Merit recognizing
Cultureas making a noteworthy contribution to public understanding of the American
legal system. See ABA Announces Media Winners in Gavel Awards Competition, P.R.
Newswire,July 8, 1994, availablein LEXIS,News Library,CurnwsFile.
7. Among the rare early dissenters was Michael Kinsley. See Michael Kinsley,Martyr
Complex, The New Republic, Sept. 13, 1993, at 4. Slower paced legal scholarship has
yielded some additional critiques that vary in their degree of dissent. See, e.g., Scott C.
Idelman, The Sacred, the Profane, and the Instrumental:Valuing Religion in the Culture
of Disbelief, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1313, 1316, 1348-52 (1994) (agreeing with much of
Carter's observations, but arguing that Carter's theory of government-religion relations
would reduce religious liberty to a mere tool of society); Levinson, supra note 5, at
1876-81 (inter alia, describing Carter'sown arguments as made in secular language and
disputing that secular listeners should or could accept a religious mode of argument);
Kathleen M. Sullivan,God as a Lobby,61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1655 (1994) (Carter'sarguments
for religious autonomy necessarilyconflict with argumentsfavoringreligion in public life).

RELIGIOUSFREEDOM

1995]

475

Part III discusses how Culture's approach trivializes the concerns of
religions and cultures outside the mainstream. In the first section of Part
III, I argue that while Culture purports to represent the interests of all
religions and to seek the best interests of all Americans, in fact faiths and
cultures outside the mainstream are shortchanged in its analysis. Culture
considers its theme solely from the perspective of majority religions and
cultures, even when it purports to address minority concerns. Adopting
this perspective, Cultureminimizes the impact of race and culture on religious freedom debates and minimizes the need for the law to play the
role of mediator between majority and minority religions. In the second
section of Part III, I demonstrate that Culture expressly trivializes specific
religious expressions that are outside the mainstream. There I discuss
Culture's passing reference to liberation theology and its discussion of
political preaching, and I show that Culture itself rejects religious discourse that is inconsistent with its author's own theological and political
assumptions, even as it argues for a broader embrace of religious
discourse.
Part IV argues that the attitude that Carter describes as our culture's
approach to "religion" instead reflects our general approach to perspectives that are not those of the relevant majority. I argue that Cultureitself
falls prey to our cultural tendency to assume that the majority's perspective reflects the perspective of all groups within the culture, i.e., what
holds true for the religious majority must be true for other groups as well.
The result of such erroneous assumptions is that the concerns of those
outside the majority are trivialized. Culture's analytical approach fails to
recognize this problem, and in the end, in blaming the "culture" for our
own "disbelief," Culture advocates a definition of religious faithfulness
and religious freedom that is a dangerous embrace for those who purport
to take law or religion seriously.
I.

THE TRIVALIzATION THESIS

Religiosity, according to Stephen Carter, is resurgent in America and
indeed has always been a strong part of American life (pp. 4, 8, 15, 20,
186-87). But today, he claims in Culture, persons who proclaim their
faith by word or deed in the public square8 are subject to criticism, ridicule, and embarrassment, or they simply are not taken seriously.
Culture applauds the principle of the separation of church and state
(p. 3). But it argues that we have taken the concept of separation too far
and have created a society that "exerts pressure to treat religion as a
hobby," discouraging the faithful from engaging in "God-talk"-public
discussion in explicitly religious terms-and from following the rules of
their faith if those rules require behavior that secular society considers
8. Carter defines "public square"for his readers as "the arena in which our public
moral and political battles are fought" (p. 51).
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objectionable (p. 29).9 Even within the acceptable mainstream, argues
Carter, Americans seem most comfortable with those who limit their religious observances to a few sessions of private worship and prayer but who
are "too secularized to let their faiths influence the rest of the week" (p.
29).10 Carter notes that this discomfort with expressly religious discourse
is heightened when the faithful not only refuse to keep quiet about their
beliefs, but also act on belief in ways contrary to the dictates of secular
society (pp. 8, 29).
Carter claims that American culture treats religion as an inferior basis for decisionmaking in the public arena (pp. 15, 16). In this "Culture
of Disbelief," the selective rejection of religiously-based opinions occurs
not because of the listener's disagreement with the cause espoused, but
rather because the religiously-based viewpoint is not viewed as rational.
He claims that American culture, buttressed by liberal political theory,"1
has made rationality a nonnegotiable prerequisite for discourse in the
public square (pp. 42-43, 54-56).12 But this requirement ignores the
9. Carter defines religion as a "tradition of group worship (as against individual
metaphysic) that presupposes the existence of a sentience beyond the human and capable
of acting outside of the observed principles and limits of natural science, and, further, a
tradition that makes demands of some kind on its adherents" (p. 17). Carter expressly
recognizes that some will criticize his definition of religion as underinclusive (p. 18).
10. Carter uses the terms "mainstream"and "mainline" to refer to Protestant,
Catholic, andJewish religious traditions. In context, the term appears to connote a degree
of political acceptance and political power (e.g., p. 29-32). I will use the term to refer to
white Protestantsand Catholics only, unless otherwise noted. I think that his inclusion of
Judaism, while in some sense understandable,is subject too many conditions and, as I will
explain later, cultural minorities who are Christianoften have traditions that significantly
distinguish them from majorityChristians. For lack of a better term, I will use the term
"minority"to refer to faiths outside the mainstream and "minoritycultures" to refer to
racial groups comprising persons of color.
11. Carter uses the term "liberalism"to denote "the philosophical tradition that
undergirds the Western ideal of political democracyand individualliberty". He notes that
conservatives as well as liberals often claim to represent the "liberal" tradition.
Occasionally,he also uses the word liberal in its contemporarypolitical sense, but he relies
upon the context to indicate this use (p. 55 n.*).
12. Cartercriticizestheoristswho argue that individualsshould attempt to justify their
political choices in terms of rational speech rather than appeals to morality. See, e.g.,
Bruce Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. Phil. 5, 16-18 (1989) (cited at pp. 54-56).
Frederick Mark Gedicks, another critic of the trend, has explained the point in a helpful
way. He says that underlying liberal political theory is the Lockean notion that there exist
(1) an inviolable privatesphere of individualrights that government cannot touch and that
is freely subject to both rational thought and passion, and (2) a public sphere controlled
by government which, because it must balance the various and sometimes conflicting
interests, must rely solely on rational thought in attempting to reach a common good.
Under this view, "rational"discourse is necessary in the public sphere, in order that
government remain "neutral"in its decisionmaking. See FrederickM. Gedicks, Public Life
and Hostilityto Religion, 78 Va. L. Rev. 671, 674-76 (1992); see also MichaelJ. Perry,Love
and Power: The Role of Religion and Moralityin American Politics 10, 15 (1991) (arguing
that approaches excluding religious dialogue are not neutral and that the only truly
neutral/impartial practice of political justification is to let everyone rely upon their
relevant convictions) (cited at p. 56). The complaint that religion is improperly shut out
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fact that religion is, by definition, a different way of knowing the world
(p. 43).13 According to Culture,despite the fact that religious reasoning
may differ from secular reasoning, religious reasoning ought to be
respected as an acceptable form of public discourse (pp. 42-43,
230-36). 14
In making its case for more respect for religion, Cultureadvances the
familiar but controversial point that the original purpose behind the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses contained in the First Amendmentl5 was to protect religion from government, not to protect governCulturethus takes on those
ment from religion (pp. 105-06, 115-20).16
of the public arena has been echoed by scholars who also argue for greater public
accommodation of religious activities. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious
Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115, 126 (1992). Others argue that these
accommodationists place too little weight on the Establishment Clause and erroneously
focus primarilyupon the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with
Accommodation, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 743, 747-48 (1992) (pro-accommodationists
frequently collapse the two religion clauses but Establishment Clause must be given its
due); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 195, 197
(1992) (EstablishmentClause operates to end the war between the sects as part of a social
contract).
13. Carter points out that for the religious person, what some might see as irrational
passion is in fact rational behavior by the standardsof the religion (p. 217).
14. Carter says that "toleration" of religious viewpoints is not enough. Using
Christianity'srelationship to other faiths as an example, he argues, "Tolerance without
respect means little; if I tolerate you but do not respect you, the message of my tolerance
... is that it is my forbearance, not your right, and certainly not the nation's commitment to

equality, that frees you to practice your religion" (p. 93; see also p. 230). It could be
argued that Carter's separation of the idea of tolerance from the idea of respect is
inconsistent with the concept of tolerance in some liberal political theory. See, e.g., John
Rawls,A Theory ofJustice 211-21 (1971) (tolerance emerges from the concept ofjustice as
fairness and is necessitated by the principle of equality). To the extent that by "respect"
Carter means an acknowledgement of the inherent validityof the religious point of view,
Carteralso may be asking seculariststo do the impossible. Responding to Carter,Sanford
Levinson has commented that a secularistcannot accept the argument that "God requires
X"; indeed, it is the rejection of that very approach that makes the person a secularist.
Levinson, supra note 5, at 1879.
15. The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press;or the right of the people peaceablyto assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I.
16. But see, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw ? 14-3, at 1158-59
(2d ed. 1988) (comparing viewsof ThomasJefferson,James Madison, and Roger Williams,
and arguing that history of the religion clauses reflects not one but three views: (1)
concern that religion must be protected from corruption by government (Williams); (2)
concern that government and privatesecular interests must be protected from corruption
by religion Jefferson); and (3) concern that both religion and government would be best
advanced through separation (Madison)); see also Arlin M. Adams & CharlesJ. Emmerich,
A Nation Dedicated to Religious Liberty: The Constitutional Heritage of the Religion
Clauses 21-31 (1990) (identifying three different approaches and stating that "[a]ny
attempt to reduce the Founders' views to one position or to read the beliefs of certain
Founders, no matter how prominent, into the First Amendment is apt to produce
indefensible and culturallyunacceptable results"). While Carteroffers a passing reference
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who wish to equate religious speech with other speech. It argues that
religious devotion is not just ordinary speech under the First Amendment, nor are religiously-based actions just another matter of conscience
(pp. 130-32). According to Carter, religion matters to adherents in ways
that other speech and other matters of conscience do not, and, in his
view, the religion clauses provide for unique protections (p. 35).17
Additionally, Cultureclaims that religiously-informed viewpoints help
preserve democracy in society. Citing de Tocqueville and others, Carter
argues that "the very aspect of religions that many of their critics most
fear-that the religiously devout, in the name of their faith, take positions that differ from approved state policy-is one of their strengths" (p.
37). In our pluralistic society, Carter says, the religions act against the
threat of tyranny by offering alternative sources of moral understanding,
and by splitting off the allegiances of citizens, pressing them toward views
that differ from those of the state (pp. 35-37).18
Culture also stresses the need for the religions to maintain their autonomy from the state. It warns that through increasing reliance upon
the state's largess, the religions threaten their independence, and thus,
the essential freedom of each religion to determine the content of its own
theology.19
to some dissent on the issue of Jefferson's views, ("[s]ome scholars argue that Jefferson
believed that religion had no role in government" (p. 117)), he discounts such dissent
quickly and proceeds to recount the history of the religion clauses as if there can be no
serious debate about his point, and even refers to that historyas "unambiguous"(p. 119).
17. Carter's concern hearkens to an ongoing debate in academia over what
accommodations government should make for religious speech. Carter sides with
accommodationists who favor broad governmental support and encouragement of
religious expressions in the public sphere. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 12, at 126. At
the other end of the spectrum are those who claim that the Constitution requires that the
state neither encourage nor condemn religious speech. See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 12, at
771-81; Sullivan, supra note 12, at 202-08. As Carter notes, some religious persons
respond that the latter approach, sometimes referred to as "neutrality"to religion, is
actuallyhostility toward religion (p. 51), and some even claim the approach indeed serves
to promote state-chosen "religions"such as secular humanism. See, e.g., Homer Duncan,
Secular Humanism: The Most Dangerous Religion in America (1979). Cartersays that he
does not subscribe to the hostility thesis but says he understands why religious people
might see it that way (p. 52).
18. See, e.g., Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 295, 291 (George
Lawrence trans., 1969).
19. Carter discusses BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), in which
the Supreme Court held that the Internal Revenue Service could withhold tax-exempt
status from educational institutions that discriminate on the basis of race. Bob Jones
Universityunsuccessfullyclaimed a right to a religious exemption from the relevant IRS
regulations (pp. 150-51). Carter states that
[o]ne must be careful ... not to be so blinded by the immoralityof racism that
one misses the glaring problem for the religions that the BobJonescase illustrates.
By accepting the offer of special tax treatment, the religions themselves may have
paved the wayfor a future in which they are told that they will lose their treasured
tax status unless they reflect, in theology and practices, whatever the current
government policy might be ....

(Pp. 151-52.)
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Culture rejects the notion that the presence of lively religious rhetoric in the political arena is evidence that public religious discourse is alive
and well (pp. 44_45).20 Rather, it dismisses this "civil religion," chiding
those across the political spectrum who "treat Holy Scripture like a dictionary of familiar quotations" (p. 45).21 Practitioners of civil religion,
says Carter, erroneously use God-talk to argue that God supports one or
another political cause (pp. 45, 51-52).22 But Carter states that he is
equally offended by suggestions that God-talk has no place in public discussions (p. 48).
While in much of Culture he defends religious speech, in a chapter
entitled "Political Preaching," Carter launches an attack against some of
the faithful whom he says also trivialize religion. Thus, Culturecondemns
"political preachers" who, in Carter's view, improperly attempt to use religion to bend their flocks to adopt certain political points of view. Culture
argues that when politics and theology are always in sync, one has reason
to suspect the validity of the theology (pp. 67-82). According to Carter,
then, political preachers are not much different from the practitioners of
civil religion (p. 81).
Culture asserts that the denigration of public religious discourse that
we are now witnessing is a relatively new phenomenon, at least among
liberals who, he claims, embraced religious rhetoric as a part of the social
gospel. Culture thus argues that the openly religious rhetoric that characterized the Civil Rights Movement presents a "dilemma" for liberals and
liberal philosophers who now complain when conservatives engage in
God-talk (pp. 19, 227).23 According to Carter, "liberal philosophy's distaste for explicit religious argument ... cannot accommodate the openly
20. Kathleen Sullivanhas stated that, although such evidence is not alone conclusive,
it suggests that "if the Court was in the business of wholesale secularization, it has not
succeeded." Sullivan, supra note 12, at 196.
21. Here Carter embraces, see p. 51, Frederick Mark Gedicks's definition of civil
religion: "the utterance of 'faintlyprotestantplatitudeswhich reaffirmthe religious base of
American culture despite being largely void of theological significance.'" Frederick M.
Gedicks, The Religious, the Secular, and the Antithetical, 20 Cap. U. L. Rev. 113, 122
(1991).

22. For example, he notes President George Bush's 1992 State of the Union Message
in which Bush stated that "bythe grace of God, Americawon the cold war"(p. 45). Carter
analyzes the line in this way:
With these five short words, a politician conveys the sense of a people specially
favored by the Almighty-quite flatteringto one's constituents. At the same time,
one wrapsthe mantle of godliness around one's policies. The message is not only
that our faith in God helped us, but that God is on our side. We won the cold war
not simply by God's grace, but by God's will; we won not only because God was
with us, but, in effect, because God is one of us. The message, at bottom, is that
God is an American-and maybe even a Republican. (P. 45.)
23. From the context, it appears that Carter intends the word "liberal" to be
understood in contemporarypolitical terms. See supra note 11. In addition to citing the
religious rhetoric of the Civil Rights movement, he also cites with less flourish the support
of ChristianevangelicalsforJimmy Carterand the anti-waractivitiesof some clergy during
the Vietnam War (pp. 48-49, 60, 227-29).
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and unashamedly religious rhetoric of the nonviolent civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s" (p. 227). Indeed, according to Carter,
"there is much depressing evidence that the religious voice is required to
stay out of the public square only when it is pressed in a conservative
cause" (p. 64).
Carter says that he seeks to demonstrate how a discussion of contro. . . the antireligious fervor that
versial issues might proceed-"without
often characterizes the liberal case" and "without resort to the sort of
liberal-bashing that often characterizes the rhetoric of the religious right"
(p. 15). Thus, he moves from the general topic of God-talk to discussing
issues such as abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, creationism,
prayer in public schools, and subsidizing religious education.24 He informs readers that he is among the long list of scholars criticizing the rule
in Lemon v. Kurtzman,25in which the Supreme Court determined that, to
pass Establishment Clause muster, (1) state action must have a secular
legislative purpose, (2) its principal and primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) the action must not foster
an excessive entanglement with religion.26 Criticizing the secular purpose arm of that test, Carter suggests that rather than looking to religious
motivation, the courts should focus more upon whether the state action
has the effect of promoting religion (p. 191).
Culturenever completely answers the question of how the "Culture of
Disbelief" came into being. It traces its beginnings to Roe v. Wade,27in
which the United States Supreme Court determined that a woman possesses a constitutionally protected right to have an abortion (pp.
56-58).28 But that explanation must be incomplete, given that Carter
notes that "l[t]here is little evidence to support the idea that most Americans prefer to think of the religions as remaining outside the public
square" (pp. 15, 119). In fact, citing surveys, he suggests that the majority
of Americans are religious (pp. 4, 8, 111, 119, 137, 240).29 Culturemakes
vague references to "opinion leaders," "opinion makers," "well-educated
professionals," "guardians of the public square," and "the legal culture
that guards the public square," (pp. 4, 8, 23, 49, 54, 119), implying that
these groups are responsible.30 Yet, Culturenever explains why a religious
majority would step so robotically to these clearly offbeat drummers.
24. The merits of these proposals are outside the scope of this Review,except to the
extent that they relate to the trivializationthesis.
25. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
26. See id. at 612-13.
27. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
28. Carter claims that Roewas like a "cold shower"for conservativeswho were forced
to come out of their "cocoons"of privatereligion and to take religion to the public square.
He contends that liberals reacted to this conservative emergence by rejecting openly
religious discourse (p. 58).
29. See infra text accompanying note 114.
30. Michael McConnell has maintained that there exists a "gulf between a largely
secularized professional and academic elite and most ordinarycitizens." McConnell, supra
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Culture's dominant theme is the way we talk about religion. Carter
alerts readers that "[t] his book is not about law, but about attitudes-the
attitudes that we as a political society hold toward religion" (p. 15). He
stresses that in the cited examples of trivialization, it is the "language chosen to make the points" that matters (p. 6). He offers that in each example, "one sees a trend in our political and legal cultures toward treating
religious beliefs as arbitrary and unimportant, a trend supported by a
rhetoric that implies that there is something wrong with religious devotion" (p. 6).
II.

LIBERTIES
OF LAW: RELIGIOUS
TRIVIALIZATION
CULTURE'S

In this section, I examine Culture's evidence that our legal culture
trivializes religion. Here, I demonstrate that Culturegreatly oversimplifies
the examples it discusses, failing to mention to readers key facts that argue against the implications it draws from the case law. Rather than the
evenhanded treatment of facts that we might expect from Stephen
Carter, we are provided with selective reporting.
Carter tells his readers that the courts, and particularly the Supreme
Court, have allowed the state to "run roughshod" over the religions (p.
38). But ironically, of the more than seventy cases mentioned in Culture,
the large majority are offered merely for legal background. Far fewer are
offered as support for Culture's thesis that the law trivializes religion, and
the most significant cases Carter draws on involve minority faiths. Sadly,
in discussing the alleged examples of trivialization in the case law that it
cites, Culture repeatedly provides misleading glosses.
The point is illustrated by Culture's references to the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Wallace v. Jafftee,31 one of several decisions
that Cultureuses to critique the Lemon test.32 Carter informs readers that
in Wallace the Court "struck down an Alabama statute allowing schools
that so desired to set aside one minute for 'meditation or voluntary
prayer.' " He states that theJustices argued that "the only purpose of the
note 12, at 126. Carter does not draw the secularization line so clearly in Culture. He
seems to suggest that religiosity and secularism exist at the same time across the culture.
For example, he suggests that most members of Congress are religious (pp. 111, 240).
Carter does not explain whether he would include them among the "opinion makers"or
"opinion leaders," but it seems logical that he should, not only by virtue of the political
positions they hold, but also by virtue of the financial resources and educational
background possessed by most members. Similarly,in his examples of trivialization,he
sometimes includes challenges to religious leaders. For example, he complains of an
ordained minister who, being also a therapist,coauthored a book suggesting that one who
gives up ties with family and material wealth in order to follow a religious community is
suffering from a "toxic faith." Carter asks how Moses or Mohammed would be judged
under this definition (p. 81). At another point, he criticizes the National Council of
Churches for challenging what it considered to be improper invocations of God's name
during the Republican National Convention (p. 50).
31. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
32. See supra text accompanying note 25.
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legislation was a religious one," (i.e., the statute had no secular purpose
within the meaning of Lemon), and the Justices reasoned that any student
was free to pray even the absence of a statute (pp. 190-91). Thus, Carter
tells the public that the Court's reasoning in Wallace"reflects a contemporary suspicion of [religious] accommodations"33 and asks, "[W] hy should
it matter that some legislators hope that many students will pray?" (p.
191).
The Wallace Court considered the question of whether an Alabama
statute providing for a moment of silence "for meditation and voluntary
prayer" in public schools violated the Establishment Clause. At the time
of that consideration, Alabama also had in force a statute providing for a
moment of silence for "meditation."34 That statute predated the one
before the Court. The question before the Court, then, was not, as
Carter suggests, the choice between a meditation or prayer statute and no
statute, but rather it was whether the new statute raised Establishment
Clause problems. Moreover the context of Wallacecannot be ignored in
interpreting its outcome. State actors took the view that the Constitution
did not prohibit states from establishing a religion and there was evidence that some of these actors were doing more than simply affording
time for voluntary prayer by students.35
33. The term "accommodations"is used to refer to many different types of state
action. One can seek accommodation by seeking exemption from generally applicable
lawswhen application of those lawswould effectivelyprohibit the exercise of religion. See,
e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See
discussion infra text accompanying note 63. At the other end of the spectrum, state
acknowledgement of religion or use of its symbols (as in the case of state sponsorship of a
nativityscene in a public square during the Christmasseason) has been mentioned in the
accommodation context. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984). Carter says
that when he uses the term he means those accommodations that are constitutionally
required(pp. 299-330). However, he notes that others use it to refer to permissible or
accommodations as well.
discretionary
34. The Court inquired whether this prior statute was still in place at argument. See
Transcript, December 4, 1984, WaUace,472 U.S. 38 (No. 83-812 & 83-929), reprinted in
155 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States:
ConstitutionalLaw, 1984 Term Supplement 21 (1986) [hereinafter 155 LandmarkBriefs].
35. The statute at issue was one of three passed by the state. In 1978, Alabama
mandated a moment of silence for "meditation"in classrooms, and in 1981, it passed
another statute permitting a teacher to announce a period of silence, not to exceed one
minute, " 'for meditation or voluntaryprayer.'" Wallacev.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985).
Shortly thereafter, teachers in Alabama public schools, where three of Jaffree's young
children were enrolled, began regularlyleading their classes in vocal classroom prayers.
See id. at 44. The defendants contended that these practices at the time they were
undertaken were voluntaryand not pursuant to any state statute or policy. See Jaffree v.
Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11th Cir. 1983). But see Brief of the American Civil
Liberties Union, the AlabamaCivil LibertiesUnion, and the National Coalition for Public
Education and Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae at 5-6, reprinted in 155 Landmark
Briefs, supra note 34, at 402, 414 (quoting governor'sansweras admission that the firstand
second statutes, as well as the "authorityof God,"authorized the prayerpractices). Jaffree
repeatedly informed school officials that he objected to these practices, but to no avail.
See Jaffree v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1106-08 (S.D. Ala. 1983).

1995]

FRPEEDOM
RELIGIOUS

483

All of these facts and many others were before the Supreme Court
and provided the context in which it determined the validity of the 1981
statute. Culture fails to mention any of them. Nor does it mention that
among the strongest supporters of Ishmael Jaffree were the members of
the American Jewish Congress and the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council.36
Thereafter, he filed a complaint seeking declaratoryand injunctive relief against school
officials, claiming that the prayerpracticesviolated the EstablishmentClause. At that time,
he did not challenge the statutes themselves. See Wallace,472 U.S. at 42.
In 1982, after learning ofJaffree's lawsuit,Alabama'sLegislaturepassed a third statute
permitting a teacher to "leadwilling students in a prayer"and also providing the words to a
specific prayerin which students should be led. In his second amended complaint,Jaffree
challenged all three statutes and added the governor and other state officials as parties.
See id. at 43. Subsequently,Jaffree abandoned his challenge to the first statute, see id. at
40 n.i; see also Brief of Appellees, IshmaelJaffree, et al. at 2, reprinted in 155 Landmark
Briefs, supra note 34, at 302, 306, but not before the district court upheld it. SeeJaffree v.
James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
Throughout the litigation, defendants argued that contrary to established Supreme
Court precedent, the U.S. Constitutiondoes not prohibit the establishmentof religion by a
state. See, e.g., Jaffree,705 F.2d at 1529;JurisdictionalStatement of Appellant George C.
Wallace at 4, Wallace,472 U.S. 38 (Nos. 83-812 & 83-929), reprinted in 155 Landmark
Briefs, supra note 34, at 12. The Alabama district court agreed and observed that the
554 F. Supp. at
Supreme Court "haserred in its reading of history." Boardof Sch. Comm'rs,
1128 (ruling prayer practices constitutional).
The court of appeals reversed the district court, finding that the prayer practices and
the remaining two statuteswere unconstitutionaland in so doing, criticizedthe lower court
for failing to follow the doctrine of staredecisis.See Jaffree,705 F.2d at 1529-37. On review,
the Supreme Court called the district court's observation of its error "remarkable."
Wallace,472 U.S. at 48.
On appeal, the Supreme Court summarilyaffirmed the court of appeals' invalidation
of the prayer practices and the 1982 statute authorizing a specific prayer. The governor
then argued that the remaining meditation or prayer statute was a permissible
accommodation of religion. See Brief of Appellant, George C. Wallace, Wallace,472 U.S.
38 (Nos. 83-812 & 83-929), reprinted in 155 LandmarkBriefs, supra note 34, at 182.
It is worth noting that Carterhimself concedes the Founders' generation probablydid
not intend to prohibit states from establishing a religion (p. 118). Yet, based on modern
societal considerations, he agrees with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment as requiring application of the EstablishmentClause to the states,
see Cantwellv. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), although he warnsof taking the modern
requirements analysistoo far (pp. 118-20). See also Akhil R. Amar,The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 Yale LJ. 1131, 1157-60 (1991) (questioning Cantwellanalysis).
36. See Brief of the AmericanJewish Congress on Behalf of Itself and the National
Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees,
Wallace,472 U.S. 38 (No. 83-812 & 83-929), reprinted in 155 LandmarkBriefs, supra note
34, at 471. These amici claimed to represent "allmajorJewishcommunities in the United
States." Id. at viii. More than 500 intervenorssupported defendants' position. See Brief of
Appellants Douglas T. Smith et al. at 3-4, Wallace,472 U.S. 38 (No. 83-812 & 83-929),
reprinted in 155 LandmarkBriefs, supra note 34, at 237. Several religious organizations
composed predominantlyof mainstreamadherents also supported the governor. See, e.g.,
Brief of Moral Majority,Inc. as Amicus and Brief of Christian Legal Society and National
Association of Evangelicalsas Amici Curiae, Wallace,472 U.S. 38 (No. 83-812 & 83-929),
both available on LEXIS,Genfed Library,Briefs File. The United States filed an amicus
brief urging the constitutionalityof the statute. See Brief of the United States as Amicus
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Carter states that he generally agrees with the outcomes in the cases
on prayer in public schools, including Wallace.37Thus, his complaint
seems based upon meaning that he reads into a questionable gloss of the
Court's reasoning. But the facts he does not mention demonstrate that
what was at issue in Wallacewas considerably more than contemporary
suspicion of religious accommodations or concern over the mere hopes
of legislators.38
Even construing Carter'scomplaint as an attack on the Lemontest in
general does not save it. Elsewhere, Carteradmits that the courts tend to
ignore the requirements of Lemonwhen applying the test stringently
would prove too disruptive to mainstream religious interests (p. 113).39
At least where mainstreamfaiths are concerned, this abandonment of the
Lemonfactors argues against the pattern of legal disrespect that Carter
discerns.40
Curiae, Wallace,472 U.S. 38 (No. 83-812 & 83-929) reprinted in 155 Landmark Briefs,
supra note 34, at 366. According to one court, Jaffree considered himself "an agnostic"
and believed that exposure to religion in school would prevent his children from having an
open mind and freely making a choice to accept or reject religion in the future. Jaffree v.
James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 729 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
37. In addition to Wallace,see Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
38. Surely, with respect to the first meditation statute, some of the legislators who
voted for it hoped that students would pray.
39. Indeed, one commentator has opined, "Tothe extent that there remainsa secular
purpose standard, it is no longer meaningful." Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as
Politics in the Public Sphere, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 747, 769 (1993). Another has observed
that it is not at all clear that Lemondoes not permit a post hoc secular rationale in order to
justify state action that was originally religiously motivated. See Sullivan,supra note 12.
40. In these discussions, Carterflips Lemon,suggesting that it invalidatesstate action
any time there is a religious purpose, regardlessof whether or not a secular purpose is also
present. He notes that courts have "confus[ed] the political purpose for which the statute
was enacted with the religious sensibilities of legislators or their constituents" and that
Lemonwould be workable if the courts accepted any legitimate political purpose (pp.
111-12).
In fact, the Court has at least given lip service to the claim that state action that is
religiouslymotivated can pass EstablishmentClause muster if it also has a secular purpose
and the religious purpose is not preeminent. See Wallace,472 U.S. at 56 (statute that is
motivated in part by a religious purpose may still satisfysecular purpose test, but "mustbe
invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion"). The problem is
that examples of such cases involving state action on behalf of mainstream faiths are
somewhat rare. Carterdismissesboth Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding
town sponsorship of nativity scene) and Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1963)
(upholding prayers at the opening of legislative sessions) as isolated examples and yet
inconsistencies that clearly demonstrate why Lemonis an unworkable test (pp. 113-14).
But in some cases, the Court has also noted no EstablishmentClause bar to the state's
providing the same access to its largessas afforded secular groups, so long as there was no
risk of excessive entanglement with religious interests. See, e.g., Kendrickv. Bowen, 487
U.S. 589 (1988) (approving inclusion of religious organizations in grants for sex and
pregnancy education programsand noting that such inclusion was necessaryfor success of
the program); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(upholding inclusion of religiouslysponsored colleges among institutions receivingfederal
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Carter's references to the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Robertsv.
Madigan4loffer a different variation on the same theme. Of Roberts,Culture states:

When citizens do act in their public selves as though their faith
matters, they risk not only ridicule, but actual punishment. In
Colorado, a public school teacher was ordered by his superiors,
on pain of disciplinaryaction, to remove his personal Bible from
his desk where students might see it. He was forbidden to read
it silently when his students were involved in other activities. He
was also told to take awaybooks on Christianityhe had added to
the classroom library,although books on Native American religious traditions,as well as on the occult, were allowed to remain.
A federal appeals court upheld the instruction, explaining that
grants for building academic facilities and noting facilities would be used solely for secular
purposes and there was a low risk of entanglement); Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970) (churches may be included among wide arrayof nonprofit groups doing work for
public good and entitled to tax exemption); see also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (decided after Cultureand granting religious
groups the same access to public school premises as afforded secular groups does not
violate the EstablishmentClause). These cases indicate that it is too simplistic to suggest
that the mere presence of a religious benefit constitutes an EstablishmentClause violation
under Lemon.

Carter's attempt to demonstrate his point by using Edwardsv. Aguillardis similarly
hyperbolic. In Edwards,he claims the Court invalidated a law requiring schools to teach
scientific creationism in public schools "because most of its supporters were religiously
motivated .

. .

." (p. 111). Carter contrasts his own view, saying that he agrees with the

outcome because creationism is "bad science," not because religion was an issue (pp.
161-62) and analogizes that the logic of Edwardswould necessarilyinvalidatethe teaching
of evolution or a nuclear arms freeze if either were religiously motivated (p. 111).
Carter does not mention that in Edwardsthe state claimed that the avowed secular
purpose of teaching creationism was to protect academic freedom and that the Court
rejected this claim as a sham for a preeminent religious purpose. See id. at 94. Nor does
Carter himself attempt to argue that the academic freedom position was not a sham, and
indeed, he defends the result of Edwards,if not the alleged logic. Moreover,Carterfails to
acknowledge that the teaching of evolution or of a nuclear arms freeze is not inherently
religious. These subjects remain quite distinguishable from creationism and the logic
supporting the exclusion of one, whether appropriateor not, does not necessarilycompel
the exclusion of the other.
It is worth noting that because mainstream religionists control both the state and
private sector institutions, and thus can both satisfy their secular needs and have a
reasonable chance at creating a religiously favorable climate for themselves through the
exercise of that control, they face more difficulty than minority faiths and cultures in
arguing that express recognition of religious activity serves some "secular"purpose. I
would argue that the "motivation"behind the school prayer legislation in Wallaceor the
scientific creationism law in Edwardsshould be, for Establishment Clause purposes,
distinguishable from the "motivation"behind legislation the majority passes to preserve
minority religious or cultural rights. It is noteworthy that the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act Amendments specifically state that "the lack of adequate and clear legal
protection for the religious use of peyote by Indians may serve to stigmatize and
marginalize Indian tribes and cultures, and increase the risk that they will be exposed to
discriminatorytreatment." See American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-344 (Oct. 6, 1994) [hereinafter AIRFAAmendments].
41. 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990).
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the teacher could not be allowed to create a religious atmosphere in the classroom; which, it seems, might happen if the
students knew he was a Christian. (Pp. 11-12.)
At another point he says the Tenth Circuit:
held, . . . that a school district violated no religious freedom
rights when it forbade a teacher to display his personal Bible
where the students could see it, or to read it silently when his
students were involved in work that did not require his direct
supervision ....
Indeed, the judges suggested, even had the
district not implemented the ban, the Establishment Clause
would probably have provided a basis for a court order including the same prohibition. (P. 189.)42
In Roberts,a fifth grade public school teacher had set aside daily silent reading time, permitting students to bring their own books or select
from a large classroom library comprised of books from the teacher's personal collection. Two of those books were The Bible in Pictures and The
Stories ofJesus. During this period, the teacher would often silently read
the Bible. The teacher had also put up a poster in the classroom that
featured an outdoor scene and read, "You have only to open your eyes to
see the hand of God." After a visiting parent complained, the school district required removal of the books and the poster and ordered Roberts
to cease reading his Bible and keeping it on his desk during classroom
hours. Roberts sued.
In that lawsuit, Roberts did not assert a free exercise claim. He
claimed instead that the school district had violated his rights to free expression and academic freedom under the First Amendment. He also
claimed that, in removing only the Christian books, the school district
disfavored Christianity among the religions in violation of the Establishment Clause.43
42. Although Robertsis only a Tenth Circuit case, it is one of the more frequently
mentioned cases in Culture(pp. 12, 57, 108, 172, 189).
43. Roberts argued that his purpose in reading the Bible was to set an example of an
adult reading for his students. According to the district court, he compared his use of the
Bible and religious material in class to the term "one nation under God"in the pledge of
allegiance. See Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505, 1509 (D. Colo. 1989), aff'd, 921
F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990). The majority addressed the complaint as Roberts
characterizedit. The dissent, while expresslynoting that Robertswas not relying upon the
Free Exercise Clause, nevertheless argued that the court should have treated Roberts's
claim as if it were a free exercise claim, and thus required the state to show a "compelling
interest"that required the burdening of Roberts'sright to the assumed free exercise of his
religion. See Roberts,
921 F.2d at 1060. The dissent did not explain why Robertsshould not
be held to his pleadings like any other plaintiff. See id. at 1059-64; see also discussion of
International Soc'y for KrishnaConsciousness,Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) infra note 46.
The district court, while noting that Roberts did not raise a free exercise claim, stated,
without the benefit of briefing or argument, that such a claim would not have altered its
analysis. See Roberts,702 F. Supp. at 1512.
Thus, ironically, Roberts's choice to couch his argument in secular terms allowed
defendants to use religion offensively, i.e., as the reason why the Establishment Clause
might be violated, and also permitted the court to consider his actions collectively (rather
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The Tenth Circuit sustained the school district's actions. In so doing, the majority concluded that the two Christian books in question were
written primarily for the purpose of encouraging the acceptance of a particular faith and that, by contrast, the others were "about" religion.44
These facts are absent from Carter's description. Had they been
given their due, some readers might have concluded that the court was
concerned about more than just what would happen if the students knew
that Roberts was a Christian.45
Culture's discussion of the Wallace and Robertscases are not isolated
examples of omissions. With troubling frequency, Culture glosses over
key facts that if present, would weaken the positions it espouses.46 Morethan, for example, simply the Bible reading itself). Moreover,it also freed the court from
considering the free exercise implications of his behavior. With respect to such litigation
choices, should plaintiffs be heard to complain, "the culture made me do it"?
44. Reviewingtheir contents, the court distinguished these from the books on Native
American religions and on the occult, as well as from the Bible itself, arguing that the latter
books were aboutreligion, while the former encouraged acceptance of a particularfaith.
The Tenth Circuit took pains to state, and Carteracknowledges (p. 207), that there is no
ban against teaching aboutChristianityor aboutany other religion in the classroom. The
court also expresslyrecognized that the Bible is both a religious text and otherwise a great
work of literature. See Roberts,702 F. Supp. at 1513. In fact, at Roberts' request, the court
ordered the school district to replace the Bible in the school's central library after
someone had removed it from the shelves.
It is worth noting that Roberts did not challenge the order to take down the poster.
See Roberts,
921 F.2d at 1059. For this reason, the dissent complained that court should not
have considered the poster in its analysis. See id. at 1059 n.1 (Barret, CJ., dissenting).
45. Building on this problematic interpretation of Roberts,Carter also offers other
problematic hypotheticals. He asks, in effect, "whatnext?"
One wonders what the school, and the courts, might do if, as many Christiansdo,
the teacher came to school on Ash Wednesdaywith ashes in the shape of a cross
imposed on his forehead-would he be required to wash them off? He just
might. Early in 1993, a judge required a prosecutor arguing a case on Ash
Wednesday to clean the ashes from his forehead, lest the jury might be
influenced by its knowledge of the prosecutor's religiosity. (P. 12.)
Carter offers no support for his suggestion that the prosecutor's personal religious
convictions should automaticallytrump the constitutional right of a person accused of a
criminal act to be tried before an impartialjury. He fails to explain why one should ignore
Roberts's decision to characterizehis claim as a free expression case is not important nor
does he tell us why the cumulative effect of Roberts'sactions should be ignored.
46. Consider the references to Lee v. International Soc'y for KrishnaConsciousness,
112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992). Carter tells readers that the Supreme Court was "happy"to back
airports that wanted to restrict solicitation by devotees of Krishna Consciousness merely
because travelersfound them irritating. The plaintiff society was composed of followers of
Krishna Consciousness, a religion whose teaching required its adherents to venture into
public places in order to proselytize,to distributereligious literature,to seek monetary and
other support, and to provide information about their religion. The restrictions in
question prohibited solicitation and distributioninside New YorkCityairports (but not on
sidewalksoutside) and applied to all types of groups, religious and otherwise. Plaintiffsdid
not challenge the regulations as a violation of their free exercise rights, but rather claimed
that the regulations violated civil rights laws and the right to free expression under the
First Amendment. The Supreme Court settled the solicitation question by determining
that the airports were not a public forum. However, in a companion opinion, the Court
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over, with respect to the Supreme Court, Cultureis quick to point out
when the Court acts contrary to religion, but far less eager to inform its
It is silent on the pattern of sharp disareaders of favorable treatments
struck down the ban on distributingliterature. See Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992).
Building on this interpretation,Carterinvites readers to "picturethe response should
the airports try to regulate the wearing of crucifixes or yarmulkeson similar grounds of
irritation"(p. 9). But CatholicsandJews were covered by the statute and although Krishna
Consciousness followers have a unique dress, religious dress restrictionswere not at issue.
According to Carter, in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), the Supreme
Court "shrugged"when ajewish militaryofficer challenged disciplinaryaction against him
for wearing a yarmulke in violation of military regulations (p. 12). In fact, Goldman
generated five separate opinions, and four justices dissented. Carterdevotes no attention
to the unique nature of the militaryenvironment and, in the end, concedes, as he must,
that Goldmanhas been counteracted by legislation, at least insofar as it might affect the
practices of mainstream adherents and religiousJews (p. 12).
He also tells readers that in Frazeev. Illinois Dep't of EmploymentSec., 489 U.S. 829
(1989), the Supreme Court "warned... that the protection of religiouslybased refusalsto
work (at least on Sunday) might vanish if 'Sundayshopping, or Sunday sporting, for that
matter, [would] grind to a halt" (p. 131) (quoting Frazee,489 U.S. at 835). In fact, Frazee
upheld a plaintiff's right to unemployment benefits even though he turned down a job
offer because it required him to work on his Sabbath. In so holding, the Court quoted a
passage from the opinion of the highest state court to reach the merits (which focused
upon America's weekend way of life and suggested that massive movement away from
Sunday employment would result if Frazee succeeded on his claim). The Court
commented that there was no evidence in the record to support such arguments, and that
while compelling state interestscould override a legitimate free exercise claim, "[n]o such
interest has been presented here." Frazee,489 U.S. at 835. Still, Carter confidently tells
readers that the Court issued a warning that shopping and sporting might take precedence
over religion.
Witness too, Carter's complaint that the courts will sometimes order blood
transfusions for children of Jehovah's Witnesses over their parents' religious objections
(pp. 219-20) and his attackson Justice Douglas'sdissenting opinion in Wisconsinv. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (otherwise called "a rather spectacularvictory"for religion (p. 130)).
Douglas argued that the views of the children should be solicited in deciding whether
Amish parents have the right to take their children out of public school after completion
of the eighth grade.
Carterclaims that the problem in these cases is anti-religiousanimus. He ignores his
earlier observation that were the practices noted above followed by mainstreamadherents
there would be little controversy (p. 128). He also ignores the question of the child's
competing right, a question raised by a recent case in which a 15-year-oldadherent to
orthodoxJudaism challenged his parents' custodial rights on the ground that they did not
permit him to be as strictlyobservant of his faith as he would like. See Robert Hanley,
Jewish Teen-Ager Fights Return To His Parents, N.Y.Times, Apr. 21, 1994, at B5. In fact,
one could even argue that Douglas's approach in Yoderplaces a highervalue on religious
choices than does Carter's,because it suggests that even children have the right to make
them.
47. For example, in telling readersthat the Court banned solicitation of money by the
adherents in KrishnaConsciousness,
Carterdoes not mention that, in a companion case, the
Court sustained plaintiffs'challenge to a related ban on distributingliterature (as opposed
to soliciting money) inside the same airport. Whether or not the linedrawingmakes sense,
the fact is that the Court sided with religious plaintiffs.
Interestinglyenough, when Carterreferences the actions ofJudge BrevardHand, who
ordered the removal from classroomsof forty-fourbooks that he concluded promoted the
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greement among Justices which typifies decisions that reject religious
rights claims.48 Even when majority opinions are favorable to religious
litigants, Culture discusses concurring or dissenting opinions as support
for the bias claim, although they are poor indicators of the Court's overall
approach.49 Culture attacks the Court's own line drawing yet reveals no
discernable bright line when it attempts the same.50
Sometimes, Culture's eagerness to read meaning into language backfires, as Carter's own choice of words opens him up to the same criticisms
he aims at others.5' And surprisingly often, Carter finds himself agreeing
religion of secular humanism, Carter does not point out that the case was actually a
continuation of the Wallacesaga (p. 171). See Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F.
Supp. 939, 942-44 (S.D. Ala. 1987), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684, 686-88 (11th Cir. 1987). After the
Supreme Court's decision, intervenors in Wallacerenewed an earlier motion before the
district court for "alternaterelief," seeking an order prohibiting the state school system
from promoting "'the religions of secularism, humanism, evolution, materialism,
agnosticism, atheism and others'." Smith,827 F.2d at 686. While noting that Hand was
"quicklyslapped down"by the court of appeals, Carterobserves that Hand may have been
on to something. Even if secular humanism is not a religion, he contends, it "might
properly be labeled an ideology" (p. 171). This ideology, he asserts,is deeply alienating to
some sincerely religious persons (p. 172). That one side is offended by another's
expressions does not, ultimately,of course, control EstablishmentClause or Free Exercise
Clause question. Moreover,this subsequent history of Wallacefurther supports the notion
that the Supreme Court's concern went beyond mere suspicion of motivations.
48. Cases concerning religious rights have a historyof fracturingthe Court. See, e.g.,
Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (successful Establishment Clause challenge to
invocations and benedictions at graduation ceremonies at public schools; four separate
opinions, four dissentingJustices); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) Jewish
militaryofficer prohibited from wearing yarmulkein violation of militaryregulations;five
separate opinions, four dissentingJustices); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (approving of denial of employment benefits to Native
American churchmembers fired after drug tests revealed they used peyote, even though
they consumed it in a bona fide religious ceremony; three separate opinions, four
dissenting justices); see also discussion of Smithinfra note 63.
49. For example, Carter highlights the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor in
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (p. 5) and the dissenting opinion
of Justice Douglas in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (p. 130).
50. Carter sanctions the Court in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) for its
"ridiculoushemming and hawing"over whether a creche in a public holiday display has
religious significance (saying that it clearly does and that the decision to permit the
government-sponsoredcreche waswrong (p. 94)). At the same time he complains about a
federal appellate court that banned what was, in Carter'sview, a "ratherbland 'Motorist's
Prayer' to God that appeared on official state maps" (pp. 110-11, 123). See Hall v.
Bradshaw,630 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
51. In discussingEstateof Thornton,472 U.S. at 711, Carterinadvertentlydemonstrates
the difficulties of drawingnefarious meaning from language (p. 6). In that case the Court
rejected under the EstablishmentClause a Connecticut statute that gave an absolute right
to sabbath observers not to work on their sabbath. Without challenging the outcome,
Carter focuses on a phrase from the concurringopinion of Justice O'Connor in which she
observes, "Allemployees, regardlessof their religious orientation, would value the benefit
which the statute bestows on Sabbathobservers-the right to select the day of the week in
which to refrain from labor." Id. at 711. Thus, Carter notes Michael McConnell's
observation that religiousJews would be surprised to hear that they "select"their sabbath
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with the various courts' outcomes, thus raising the question of whether
the legal and practical significance of his complaint is merely that Carter
would prefer that the Court use different words.52
Three facts render Culture's tendencies toward excess a particular
point of concern. First, Culturepurports to offer an objective view of the
legal and political landscape (i.e., promising a more mature discussion
about religion than that usually heard from liberals and conservatives) .53
But Culturefails to deliver. Second, because Cultureis a book directed to
the general public, many in Culture's audience are unfamiliar with legal
analysis and the cases discussed. They are, thus, largely reliant upon the
author for information about the courts' approaches. Knowing more,
some might feel that Culturebetrays that trust.54 Third, Carter must adsince they have been under the impression for thousands of years that it was ordained by
God (pp. 6-7) (citing McConnell,supra note 12, at 115)). But only pages later, discussing
those Christianswho believe in the exclusivityof Jesus Christ, Carter himself says that he
believes that this approach betraysa lack of faith in God's charity,"buteveryone is entitled
to choosea religious belief" (p. 90) (emphasis added). Could not one intent on finding ill
will in Carter's words charge him with religious disrespect by claiming that Christ's
exclusivityis ordained, and not the result of a choice?
52. As noted, Carteragrees with the Court's outcome in the School PrayerCases, see
supra text accompanying note 38, and with the outcome in Yoder,406 U.S. 205 (Amish
parents have right to take children out of school after eighth grade) (p. 130). He also
agrees with a New York district court's decision that a Catholic group sponsoring the St.
Patrick'sday parade had a FirstAmendment right to preclude gaysfrom marching under a
banner indicating that they are gay (pp. 33-34). See New York County Bd. of Ancient
Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y.1993).
53. See supra text accompanying note 24.
54. Unfortunately, the interpretiveattitude described here is not limited to Culture's
discussion of case law. The very first reference in Culturetakes the clear language of a
letter-to-the-editorof Newsweek, and substitutes a new interpretation of the letter. The
writer wrote to comment upon a cover story on prayerentitled "Talkingto God." Carter
tells his readers that the "disgruntledreader ... want[ed] to know why so much space had
been dedicated to such nonsense" (p. 4). The letter stated the following:
"Talkingto God" is a theocratic tract masqueradingas a news article, a religious
sermon touting prayer as a nostrum for all ailments. As in all such treatises,
strange and marveloushappenings are attributed to supernaturalcauses without
reference to alternate explanations. Surely there are scientists galore who will
vigorously dispute the allegation that heart patients in a San Francisco hospital
were magicallyhealed by the prayersof strangers. And there must be sociologists
eager to challenge Father Andrew M. Greeley's more peculiar findings, such as
his assertion that 20 percent of atheistsand agnostics pray-presumably to a deity
whose existence they deny. Your reporters unaccountably failed to solicit their
views. The NewsweekI am familiarwith publishes all sides of controversialissues
and lets readers make up their own minds. What happened here?
Letter to the Editor, Newsweek,Jan.27, 1992, at 10. While the letter writerclearlydid not
himself believe in prayer (which is, after all, his right), the letter objected to the form of
the discourse, not to the discourse itself. Carter'sgloss only makes sense if one concludes
that the letter writer said one thing, but reallymeant another.
Moreover, not all the printed letters were negative. Indeed, in an editors' note,
Newsweek commented that responses to the article "were as heartfelt as they were
polarized" and that "[m]any praised our report for discussing the nonsecular." But the
note also stated that "many atheists and agnostics-who felt underrepresented in our
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mit that at the heart of some resistance to religious speech is a fear that
the devoutly religious will see the ends as justifying the means. Culture's
approach does not assuage that fear.
I believe that Stephen Carter is right to challenge those who think
that God-talk has absolutely no place in the public square, although, as I
will discuss later, I quarrel with his characterization of the problem. I also
agree that religion is uniquely important speech to the speakers,
although that does not necessarily render it reasonable to expect hearers
to view it the same way. But despite these points of agreement, I cannot
agree that the case law supports the broad generalizations that Carter
makes, certainly not insofar as mainstream faiths are concerned. In the
end, while complaining that the law trivializes religion, Cultureitself trivializes the law,55 lulling its readers into a false sense that religious freedom
claims are really quite simple; that the battle is between the religious on
the one hand and the secular on the other. But anyone seriously concerned about these issues should be troubled by this model. In focusing
on mainstream interests while purporting to offer universal observations,
Culture glosses over serious differences in perspective between minority
piece-wrote to express skepticism about the power of prayer." And should we not, as
Michael Kinsleyhas alreadynoted, attach some significance to the fact that Newsweekdid a
cover story on prayer? See Kinsley,supra note 7, at 4. Surelythat newsmagazinesuffers no
shortage of liberals or elitists among its writers and editors. Other references in Culture
that present similar problems.
55. The difficulties of discerning a pattern of antireligious animus in the law is
demonstrated by four recently decided cases which directlyimpact upon Carter'sthesis. In
Lamb's Chapel v. Center MorichesUnion Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993), the Court
held that a school district violated the free speech rights of a church when it refused to
grant the church the same access to school premises as afforded other groups. The Court
determined that the EstablishmentClause would not be offended by the granting of such
access. In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993),
the Court struck down a city ordinance banning animal sacrifice on the ground that the
ordinance was specificallyaimed at adherents to the religion of Santeriawhich employed
animal sacrifice as one of its ritualsin violation of the Free Exercise Clause. In Zobrest v.
CatalinaFoothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993), the Court found that state provision of
a sign interpreter to interpret in a mainstreamparochial school in the same way that such
interpreters are provided for children in public schools did not violate the Establishment
Clause. On the other hand, in Board of Educ. of KiryasJoel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,
114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994), the Court held that the state of New York violated the
Establishment Clause when it set up a separate school district for practitioners of a strict
form of Judaism, even though the instruction in the district was entirely secular.
Cultureincludes a brief footnote about LukumiBabalu,which was apparentlydecided
at its press time, saying "Sometimes,of course, uncommon things happen" (p. 124 n.*).
Carter addresses both Lamb'sChapeland LukumiBabalumore fully in Stephen L. Carter,
The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 118 (1993). He notes therein
that these cases "suggestthat theJustices may yet decide to rescue religious freedom." Id.
at 119. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in KiryasJoel,Carter reportedly stated that
that case was a good example of how the state can provide aid to private school students
without violating the separation between church and state and that it offered the Supreme
Court the opportunity to reversedecisions prohibiting governmentalprovision of remedial
education on parochial school premises. See William H. Freivogel, Supreme Court Case
May Punch Hole in Church-StateWall, St. Louis Post Dispatch, Mar. 28, 1994, at 4A.
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and majority religious and cultural groups on the question of religious
freedom. In the end, as I contend below, minority group perspectives are
dangerously shortchanged.
III.

Culture's Trivialization of the Concerns of Minority Faiths
and Cultures

In this section, I contend that the most solid evidence Culture offers
that religion does not receive its due is that involving minority faiths and
cultures. But while Carter seems to express genuine concern for the protection of these groups, in focusing on mainstream perspectives, he fails
to adequately describe minority group concerns or to offer a workable
model for religious respect that protects their interests.
I also provide a specific example of how Carter's mainstream focus
leads him to trivialize the concerns of nonmainstream groups when I consider his comments in a chapter called "Political Preaching." There, too,
I show that his conclusions emerge out of his own theological and political assumptions, assumptions that are not universal. Carter ends up
committing the very crime he condemns.
A.

Which Culture?

Culture expressly recognizes that nonmainstream religions are most
in need of accommodations (pp. 125-35). Unfortunately, Culture never
attempts an analysis of the concerns of these groups that is distinct from
that which it has done for mainstream faiths and peoples. By characterizing the problem as "religion," Culture offers a "one-size-fits-all" analysis
that is ill-suited for many minority faiths and minority cultures.
Culture's discussions of EmploymentDivision, Departmentof Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith56and Lyng v. NorthwestIndian CemeteryProtective
Assoc.57 illustrate my point. In Smith, the Supreme Court permitted a
state to deny unemployment compensation to two members of the Native
American church58 who had been fired from a drug rehabilitation center
after they had tested positive for peyote, a hallucinogen the use of which
was prohibited by state law. The members claimed that they had used
peyote as part of a bona fide religious service.59 The Smith majority held
that because the law prohibiting the use of peyote was a generally applicable one, the state need not meet the "compelling interest" test, that is, it
56. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
57. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
58. With respect to the terms "NativeAmerican"and "Indian,"I use whichever term
the source discussed employs. Otherwise, I use them interchangeably. Only one of the
defendants in Smithwas Native American. See Transcript,November 6, 1989, at 4, Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (no. 88-1213), reprinted in 196 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law: 1989 Term Supplement 806
(1991) [hereinafter 196 LandmarkBriefs].
59. Under Oregon law, violation of the state's drug laws constituted work-related
misconduct that barred an award of unemployment benefits. See Smith,494 U.S. at 874.
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need not show some compelling interest that justifies the burdening of
the religious practitioners' free exercise right. Many believe that in so
holding, the Court failed to distinguish this case from prior cases in
which it had applied the compelling interest test to state burdens on religious exercises.60
In Lyng, the Court permitted the government to build a road
through federal lands even though all sides agreed that these operations
would render impossible the performance of certain necessary religious
practices and rituals by Native Americans living in the vicinity of the land
(who had, of course, inhabited the land long before the federal government came).
Culturedutifully describes Smithand Lyngas cases involving religious
traditions outside the mainstream (p. 126). Thus, Cartertells his readers
that such religions as these are most in need of "accommodations"-in
this case, exemptions from generally applicable laws to enable the free
exercise of religious rights (p. 128). Referencing Lyng, he invites the
readers to consider the uproar if New York City tried to take St. Patrick's
Cathedral by eminent domain or, considering Smith,if a state were to
outlaw the religious use of wine instead of peyote (p. 9). But after spinning out such hypotheticals, he correctly observes that they are just that:
hypothetical cases (pp. 9, 128). Indeed, as Culturenotes, such actions
would not likely occur because they affect the interests of the mainstream
and that the mainstream"willnot countenance a state effort to shut down
their religious observances; indeed, the state would never try" (p. 128).
Thus, Cultureargues that accommodations are needed for minority religious groups because, citing Frederick Mark Gedicks, "'Without exemptions, some religious groups will likely be crushed by the weight of
majoritarianlaw and culture'" (p. 129).61
One can appreciate Culture'sattempt at including minority faiths in
its efforts to vindicate religious rights. But Culture'sdescription of these
cases simply in terms of "religion"is misleading. Smithand Lynginvolved
not just religions outside of the mainstream, but Native Americanreligions. By presenting these cases to readers in terms of a degreeof religious
bias, Culturetranslates them into "majorityspeak"and, at the same time,
strips them of their racial and cultural context, a context that is essential
to a full appreciation of both the deprivation of the right and to prescribing the necessary remedy. In dealing with both mainstreamand minority
faiths, Cultureseparates the inseparable-race, culture and religion. It
thus moves racial and cultural oppression to the periphery ("majority
speak") as if what defines the religious experience of Native Americans-

60. See infra note 63.
61. Carter is quoting Gedicks, supra note 12, at 690.
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or other groups that have suffered historicallyfrom racial or cultural oppression-is plain vanilla religious disrespect.62
The danger in an approach that ignores how issues of race and culture affect religious freedom debates is revealed in Justice Scalia's now
famous lines of Smithin which he tells members of the Native American
Church, and others like them, that they have to rely upon the political
process to protect their rights to practice their religion.63 While Carter
disagrees with both the logic and outcome of Smith, Culture'sapproach
62. Such an approach cannot be justified by the reply that we should highlight our
similarities rather than our differences. Where ignoring differences merely serves to
advance the interest of the dominant group, the approach must be rejected.
63. Declining to apply the compelling interest test, Justice Scalia viewed the issue as
follows:
If the "compelling interest"test is to be applied at all, then, it must be applied
across the board, to all actions thought to be religiouslycommanded.... [Miany
lawswill not meet the test. Any society adopting such a systemwould be courting
anarchy, but that danger increasesin directproportionto the society'sdiversityof religious
beliefs, and its determinationto coerceor suppress none of them.
*

*

*

Values that are protected against government interference through
enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political
process. Just as a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to the
press by the FirstAmendment is likely to enact laws that affirmativelyfoster the
dissemination of the printed word, so also a society that believes in the negative
protection accorded to religious belief can be expectedto be solicitous of that value in its
legislation as well. . . . [citations omitted] [T]o say that a nondiscriminatory

religious-practiceexemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say
that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its
creation can be discerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that leaving
accommodationto the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequenceof democratic
government must bepreferredto a systemin which each conscienceis a law unto itself or in
which judges weigh the social importanceof all laws against the centralityof all religious
beliefs.

Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888, 890
(1990) (emphasis added). Justice Scalia's express tying of the danger of anarchy to
society's toleration of diversityof religious beliefs should lead one to wonder what other
types of toleration of diverse expression or diversityin general would be viewed as courting
anarchy.
Smith generated three separate opinions. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshalldissented, accusing the majorityof "mischaracterizingthis Court's
precedents." Id. at 908. Justice O'Connor, while concurring in the outcome, called the
majority'slogic a dramatic departure from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence
and "incompatiblewith our Nation's fundamental commitment to religious liberty." Id. at
891. All four of these justices would have applied a compelling interest test; however, in so
doing, O'Connor would have reached the same outcome as the majority, viewing the
state's war against drugs as a compelling interest despite the fact that many states had
exempted religious use of peyote from drug laws. See id. at 904-05. More recently, in
LukumiBabalu,Justice Souter spent most of his extensive concurring opinion pleading
with the Court to reverse Smithand explaining why that could be done consistent with the
doctrine of stare decisis. See Church of Lukumi BabaluAye, Inc. v. Cityof Hialeah, 113 S.
Ct. 2217, 2240-49 (1993) (Souter,J., concurring).
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does not provide much more assurance. Carter observes that "the political process will protect only the mainstream religions, not the many
smaller groups that exist at the margins"(p. 28), but he fails to acknowledge that where the religions are concerned, size does not define political power. With respect to the economic resources of the members of a
given religion and thus the religion's political power, the correlation between religion and the race of the members of the religion is quite significant (p. 128).64
Having defined the issues presented in Smith and Lyng solely in
terms of religion, Culturethen uses Smithand Lyngto prop up the mainstream claim of religious disrespect, which absent cases such as these,
would be leaning at a very precarious angle. And so, Cultureexplains:
Smithshows clearlyjust where the current Court's Free Exercise
jurisprudence is heading: toward a clear separation of church
and self, a world in which citizens who adopt religious practices
at variance with official state policy are properly made subject to
coercive authority of the state, which can, without fear of judicial intervention, pressure them to change those practices. (P.
127.)65

I would venture a guess that from the perspective of most Native Americans concerned about Smith,the case did not show where Free Exercise
jurisprudence is heading; rather, it confirmed where Free Exercisejurisprudence has alwaysbeen.66
In fact, while Culturerelies heavilyupon Smithand Lyngto support its
thesis that American culture is suspicious of religion, these cases tend to
challenge rather than support the mainstream's case of religious trivial64. The point is recognized in BarryA. Kosmin & Seymour P. Lachman, One Nation
Under God: Religion in ContemporaryAmerican Society (1993), which reports polling
information from over 113,000 Americans, purportedly the largest and most
comprehensive study ever done on religious loyalties in America. The authors point out
that the religions are social and cultural groups as well as religious groups. See id. at 264.
They also noted that, among Protestantsand Catholics,an importantfactor in determining
the "social status" of a given religious group as a whole was the presence of African
Americans, Latinos, and Asians within the group, since race affects the members'
education and economic opportunities. See id. at 264-69. In the case of the Native
Americans, their ability to call upon political power is further complicated by the political
relationship between the Indian nations and the federal and state governments.
65. When the religious are required to abandon religion in the public square, Carter
says that a separation of religion from "self"occurs (p. 127).
66. Justice Blackmun compared the sacramental use of peyote by the Native
Americans to the use of wine in a Catholic communion. He noted that during Prohibition
the federal government exempted the use of wine for sacramentalpurposes from its ban
on alcohol possession and use. "However compelling the Government's then general
interest in prohibiting the use of alcohol may have been, it could not plausibly have
asserted an interest sufficiently compelling to outweigh Catholics' right to take
communion." Smith,494 U.S. at 913 (Blackmun,J.,dissenting). It is also worth noting that
at the time that the AIFRAwas passed, the sacramentaluse of peyote was a crime in 22
states. See AIRFAAmendments of 1994, supra note 40. The sacramentaluse of wine was a
crime in none.
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ization. As Cultureconcedes, before the ink on the Smithopinion had
dried, many in mainstream America railed against its logic (pp. 127,
130).67 In fact, as Carter also acknowledges, the uproar against the reasoning of Smith (if not the outcome) was so significant that Congress
passed and the President signed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA")which, by its terms, restored the compelling interest standard
rejected in Smith(p. 269).68
Ironically,while the triumph of the RFRAmay have resolved the uncertainty that Smithcreated for mainstreamChristiansandJews, it did not
provide adequate assurancesneeded by adherents to Native American religions who were, after all, at the center of the Smithcase. In fact,Justice
O'Connor had hinted in Smiththat even under a compelling interest test,
Native Americans who used peyote in religious ceremonies would lose.69
But contrary to the suggestion in Culture's analysis, they would lose not
because their claims were religiousin nature. These adherents would lose
because they are not in the majorityculture and consequently they do not
have the political and economic resources to incorporate their cultural or
religious ideals into the relevant law. Furthermore, they would lose because the majority culture has yet to place the same value upon those
adherents' right to religious freedom as they place on their own.
Relief for some Native American religionists came in the fall of 1994,
when Congress passed and the President signed the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act of 1994 ("AIRFA").70However, that Act was limited to preserving the right to the sacramentaluse of peyote. At the time
this Review went to press, efforts to seek broader legal protections for
Native American religious activities,such as the protection of sacred sites
sought in Lyng, had been unsuccessful.7' The difference in the public
67. A large number of scholars criticized Smith. See, e.g., James D. Gordon III, Free
Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 91, 91-102 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The
Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 54-68; Michael W. McConnell, Free
Exercise Revisionism and the SmithDecision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109, 1114-28 (1990);
Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Hallucinations of Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote Case, 16 Am.
Indian L. Rev. 1, 11-26 (1991).
68. Religious Freedom RestorationAct, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. ? 2000bb (Supp. V 1993)) [hereinafterRFRA]. The RFRA'simpact remains to
be seen. See Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism,62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
230, 273-76 (1994) (questioning whether Congress can constitutionallyrequire the states
to apply a compelling interest test in light of the Smithopinion). See also Swanner v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994) (overJustice Thomas's dissent,
denying certiorari in case in which state court held state antidiscrimination statutes
provided sufficiently compelling interest to override landlord's refusal to rent to
unmarried couples on religious grounds).
69. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 904-06 (1990) (O'Connor,J., concurring) (arguing that state has compelling interest
in prohibiting the possession of peyote by its citizens and finding that exempting religious
peyote use would interfere with that interest).
70. Pub. L. No. 103-344.
71. The Senate JudiciaryReport on the Act specificallynoted that the RFRAwas not
intended to address the government's use and management of federally owned lands
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outcry over Smith (whose broad language, theoretically, raised a serious
threat of overlap with mainstream interests) and that over Lyng (which
approved complete destruction of the religion of several tribes of Native
Americans but did not threaten such overlap) is telling.72
The legislative events that followed Smithdemonstrate that the issues
that the minority and the majorityface in protecting religious freedom
rights are really quite different. For example, the House version of the
RFRAintroduced by RepresentativeCharles E. Schumer had 170 cosponsors; the Senate version, sponsored by Senators EdwardKennedy and Orrin Hatch, had at least 58 cosponsors. The AIRFA,sponsored by Representative William B. Richardson (D-NM)73 had two cosponsors. This
difference cannot be explained by any difference in the power of the
convictions of those holding the religious claims. Minority religious
groups and cultures inevitablymust rely upon either their own economic
power or having something in common with the dominant group so that
in advancing their own interests, the dominant group indirectly advances,
at least in part, the interests of the minority group.
The events surrounding passage of the RFRAand the AIRFAmake
clear that one cannot assume that a model based solely upon the majority's experience will suffice for the minority or even be consistent with
their varied interests. Culturenever confronts the possibility that its
model is inappropriate for nonwhite or non-Christian religious groups.
The experiences of members of minority religions and minority cultures
considered sacred sites by Native American religious adherents. See S. Rep. No. 103-111,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 & n.19.
In April of 1994, President Clinton signed a memorandum that recognized the sacred
place of eagle feathers in Native American culture and religious practices and directed
federal executive agencies to work with tribal governments to seek opportunities to
accommodate Native American religious practices by providing easier access to scarce
eagle carcassesand parts. See Memorandumon Distributionof Eagle Feathers for Native
American Religious Purposes, April 29, 1994, 17 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 935 (May 2,
1994). The Native American Cultural Protection and Free Exercise of Religion Act, S.
2269, 103d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994) sponsored by Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D-HI) did not
emerge from committee (see S. 2269, availablein LEXIS,Legis Library,BltrckFile). That
Act would have provided for the legalization of sacramental use of peyote (now
accomplished by the AIRFA), access to eagle feathers and ceremonial plants, the
preservation of religious rights of Native American prisoners, and restrictions on federal
land use when Native American religious use of sacred sites might be jeopardized.
72. In response to a news article that suggested Smithwas a case with limited impact,
Michael McConnell pointed out that the broad language of Smith might authorize
restricting the right to choose priests and ministers,permitting dry counties to ban the use
of communion wine, permitting the state to force changes in kosher food preparation or
requiring students to take sex education classesover their parents' objections. See Michael
W. McConnell, Religion's Privileges Have a Solid Basis in the Constitution, Legal Times,
Sept. 7, 1992, at 27 (letter to the editor); see also W.John Moore, Religious Rights In The
Balance, Nat'l J., Aug. 11, 1990, at 1981 (speculating that Smith theoretically could
authorize government curtailment of circumcision of newborn boys or ritual slaughter
needed for kosher foods).
73. S. 578, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Bltrck File; H.R. 1308, available in
LEXIS, Legis Library,Bltrck File.
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merely serve to buttress the claim that the barriers to religious freedom
could be removed if only we overcame our suspicion of any viewpoint that
is religiously informed. Rather than playing a meaningful part in the religious freedom analysis, those outside the mainstream are relegated to
stage hands in a majority play of religious oppression.
The point is further demonstrated by Culture's failure to give any
substantial attention to the law's role as a mediator between religions, a
point which concerns minority religions regardless of the race of their
adherents. Often, it is the law that stands between a minority faith or
culture and that faith or culture's extinction by the majority.74 Instead of
focusing upon the law as protector, Cultureconsistently characterizes the
law as an offender of religion. Cultureurges restraint and respect for minority faiths by the mainstream. But Culture'sarguments for the preservation and protection of minority religions from the tyranny of the majority
are legally anemic. Carter urges the dominant groups to avoid the secular grasp for power and advises that "one must be prepared to acknowledge the evil done in the name of faith, to beg forgiveness for it, and to
examine the message with care, in order to understand why and how the
followers of the message went so far astray" (pp. 89-90). As a religious
person myself, I think that Carter's advice is sound. But Cultureoffers no
advice to those whose lives and religion have been wrecked in the name
of faith. What are these people supposed to do while the dominant
group is reexamining its message with care? Such post hoc prescriptions
may purge the majority of its sin, but they will not, unfortunately, remedy
the lingering effects of a past oppression caused by these ill-conceived
grasps at power, nor will they provide reliable assurance that the same, or
even worse, oppression will not recur in the future.75 Some minority
74. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2222
(1993) (rejecting state statute prohibiting animal sacrifice that was essential practice in
minority group faith ritual).
75. Those who err on the side of separation rather than accommodation in the
EstablishmentClause/Free Exercise Clause balancing act often make this point. I am not,
however more comfortable with the analogies of Kathleen Sullivanwho has described the
Establishment Clause's relationship to the Free Exercise Clause in terms of a social
contract to end "the war of all sects against all." According to Sullivan, the Establishment
Clause "entailsthe establishment of a civil order." She continues, "Publicaffairs may no
longer be conducted as the strongest faith dictates. Minorityreligions gain from the truce
not in the sense that their faiths now may be translatedinto public policy, but in the sense
that no faith may be." Sullivan, supra note 12, at 198. The social contract metaphor
assumes agreement that the war between sects (and between sects and the world) is bad
and should be ended as well as agreement that the ceding of power to the state to mediate
is the best wayto accomplish this goal. Ultimately,whether or not one views the analogy as
appropriate depends upon one's interpretationof the constitutional contract as well as on
whether one's religion acknowledges an end to the war-even if one's religion loses-to
be a valuable result. If one perceives religion as offering only two options-a religious
"win"or a fight to the finish-it is hard to understandhow the religious person would ever
be deemed to have agreed to give up the right to recognize religious authority as higher
than the state. By insisting that religion by its very nature answers to a higher authority
(pp. 41-43), Cultureindirectly underscores the problem with such a social contract
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faiths and cultures may well wish to give the law the credit for the majority's respect and restraint.
Because of its narrow focus, Culture often seems oblivious to the fact
that the positions it takes, while advancing mainstream interests, may be
antithetical to the interests (religious and otherwise) of minority faith
groups or minority cultures. For example Culture attacks the purpose
arm of Lemon, claiming that it promotes suspicion of religious motivation.
Carter proposes instead that the courts focus upon whether the state action has the effect of promoting religion.76 In so doing, Culture gives no
consideration to the practical impact that abandoning a "purpose" test
and adopting an "effects" test would have upon the freedom of minority
faiths and cultures. Would not such an approach have the effect of shifting the burden of proof from the state (to prove a secular purpose in
response to a prima facie case) to members of minority faiths and cultures
or others who challenge the action under the Establishment Clause (to
prove a promotional effect)? Is such a result good for religion overall or
is it simply good for the dominant religions? Does not the secularist's
challenge, in effect, often vindicate the rights of minority faiths and cultures?77 Moreover, what is the practical effect of such a test? No doubt
the adoption of an "effects" test would require a more substantial factual
investigation than is currently required by the secular purpose standard,
which relies heavily upon legislative history. Since the cultural and religious mainstream controls the arms of the state and is more likely to be
the beneficiary of any religiously favorable legislation (or at least is less
likely to suffer significant negative effects), could not one argue that both
concerns for plurality and efficiency suggest that the state should bear the
burden of establishing a secular purpose? Does this allocation of the burden necessarily amount to a suspicion of religion?
analysis. As its starting point, the analysis requires an assumption that settling for the
existence of the state without change is better than courting its destruction through
resistance intended to generate change.
The social contract analysis has to be viewed with some suspicion by minority faiths
and cultures that believe that (1) they have not had the opportunity to participatefully in
the contractual negotiations, (2) their interests were not and are not otherwise
represented at the bargaining table, and (3) their interests are not represented among the
contract interpreters. Such an analysiscould be devastatingto minority group rights and
interests by counseling restraint with no assurance that the defects in the contract
formation process and the resulting inequities will ever be acknowledged or rectified. A
"contract"arising out of (or shall we say imposedunder)such nonparticipatoryconditions
might well be viewed as null and void by those excluded.
Finally,too often a majority'sperception of "order"is a minority'sview of chaos. The
act of spreading the chaos around in violation of the majority'salleged social contract has,
in some circumstances,been proven to have significantvalue as a catalystto social contract
modification.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
77. The fact that many challenges are brought by secularists does not resolve the
question in favor of accommodationistslike Carter. Indeed, given the limited resources of
many minority faith groups, the secularists' challenge may well serve the important
purpose of indirectly vindicating the rights of religionists in minority faiths and cultures.
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Similarly, in hearkening to the original intent behind the religion
clauses as support for his call for more public religion (pp. 105-06,
115-20), Culturedoes not sufficiently consider the fact that at the time
those clauses were enacted, many racial and cultural groups were not
among those whose free exercise rights-or other rights-were originally
intended to be protected. Pure original intent cannot be the basis for
their free exercise claims.78
78. In the context of considering whether states are free to establisha religion, Carter
concedes that relying on original intent alone would not provide the assurances of
pluralismthat he believes the FourteenthAmendment was meant to ensure (pp. 118-119).
He thus looks beyond original intent and argues that, in this context, the religion clauses
must be construed in light of subsequent constitutional amendments and contemporary
societal concerns. See supra note 35. Culturedoes not, however,attempt to apply a similar
argument to the question of whether the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments, the Fifth
Amendment, or other constitutional provisions should be read to prohibit religiously
motivated racial discrimination. Instead, Carter relies upon the traditional compelling
interest analysis. He vigorously argues for religious autonomy but concludes that the
country's commitment to eliminating racial discrimination is surely a compelling enough
interest to justify the BobJonesoutcome (p. 151).
But the framing of a right to be free from racial discrimination in terms of a state
interest may be offensive to some even if suggested by the compelling interest standard.
The compelling interest test as traditionallyframed maywell have the indirect and perhaps
unintended effect of dimming the lights on rights of constitutional stature whenever they
are balanced against religion, even when those rights may themselves be essential to the
freedom-religious or otherwise-of the group suffering from the discrimination. This
denigration of other rights is often accentuated by the fact that the state is often a
reluctant defender of those rights.
The BobJonescase demonstrates these points. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983). In BobJones,the Department of Justice originally took the position
that the IRS had authority to deny tax-exempt status to religious schools that practiced
racial discrimination, but it later reversed course under the Reagan Administration. The
Supreme Court then invited William T. Coleman, Jr., a prominent attorney to appear as
amicus and to defend the position abandoned by theJustice Department. See, e.g., A True
Friend of the Court, N.Y. Times, April 21, 1982, at 22. Coleman, an African American,
argued, inter alia, that the granting of tax-exemptstatus would constitute significant state
aid to an organization that practiced racial discrimination in violation of the Fifth
Amendment and contrary to the Court's holding in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455
(1973), a non-free exercise case in which the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited stateprovision of free textbooks to raciallydiscriminatoryelementary schools.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of the Judgments Below, reprinted in 136
Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Constitutional Law: 1982 Term Supplement 402-08 (1984) [hereinafter 136 Landmark
Briefs].
In contrast to Coleman's approach, amici composed of predominantly white
mainstream religious groups took advantage of the opportunity to couch the state's
interest in terms of "policy"and argued that "the wrongness of racism cannot be the real
issue in this case"because "thevery existence of a religious organizationwas at issue." See,
e.g., Brief of the American Baptist Churches in the USA and the United Presbyterian
Church in the USA, BobJones, 461 U.S. 574 (Nos. 81-1 & 81-3), reprinted in 136
LandmarkBriefs, supra, at 7-9, 14 (arguing that the IRS had exceeded its authority on
"public policy grounds").
BobJonesalso underscores the problems minoritygroups face in embracing an original
intent approach. Coleman's cornerstone case, Norwood,involved state action and the
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The perspective offered by Cultureas evidenced by the discussion
above is consistently culturally and religiously mainstream. In fact, had
Culturegiven significant independent consideration to the unique interests of minority groups, the result would not necessarily have been contrary to the view that religion should be accommodated. For example, it
might have noted that religious organizations may be the primary political and social institutions to which certain cultural groups have access;
thus, a strict separationist/anti-accommodationist
policy could effectively
bar attempts by these groups to gain the same access to the state's largess
that is regularly afforded to other groups. In other words, either in essence or by necessity arising out of minority group exclusion from secular
institutions, for the respective cultural minority groups in which they
arise, religious institutions are often an indispensable source of information about the larger world and an indispensable public voice on issues
deemed by the outside world to be purely secular. The African-American
Church provides such an example.79 In some cultural communities, reliFourteenth Amendment. But BobJonesinvolved federal action and the Fifth Amendment,
which was, of course, along with the religion clauses, a part of the original Bill of Rights.
While the Fifth Amendment contains a Due Process clause, unlike the Fourteenth, it does
not contain an Equal Protection clause nor could anyone reasonably argue that the
religious and slaveholding founding fathers and mothers intended that it be interpreted to
prevent federal racial discrimination in any context, much less in the context of religious
exercise. After the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the decision in Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the courts got around this problem by reading a
limited equal protection component into the due process provisions of the Fifth
Amendment. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). As Carter himself
notes, there are other problems with the compelling interest test in the context of its
applicability to Native American claims. See p. 133 (suggesting that under compelling
interest test Smithcase should have different outcome because states have exempted peyote
use, but Lyngmight have same). See also MartinC. Loesch, The FirstAmericans and the
"Free"Exercise of Religion, 18 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 313 (1993) (under compelling interest
test, for historical reasons, governmental interest will alwaysbe deemed to outweigh Native
American religious claims).
79. African-American churches and mosques have long been at the center of
religious, political, and cultural life for that community as is witnessed by the number of
African-American educational institutions that found their beginnings in religious
organizations, the number of African-Americanpolitical leaders that have emerged from
religious groups, and the involvement of African-Americanreligious groups in "political"
affairs, including the Civil Rights movement. (The "Brown"in Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) was the Reverend
Oliver Brown). MalcolmX also noted the beginnings
of the Black Muslim movement as a religious movement which evolved into a "religiouspolitical hybrid" after some in orthodox Islam rejected the Black Muslims as true
practitionersand outsiders attempted to argue that the movement was political rather than
religious "so that they could charge us with sedition and subversion." Malcolm X: The
Last Speeches 174-75 (Bruce Perry ed., 1989). He further noted that "we wanted our
religion" but "[w]e realized at the same time we had a problem in this society that went
beyond religion." Id. at 173-74. The fact is that the "church"is the only organization that
African Americans have historically been permitted to control. See generally C. Eric
Lincoln & Lawrence Mamiya, The Black Church in the African American Experience
200-01 (1990) (noting that religion was the only institutional area where slaves were able
to exercise some degree of freedom). Thus, the church fulfilled needs that were not being
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gion may be so inseparable from the ethnic and political culture of the
community itself, that a policy against accommodation may have implications for the minority culture beyond those that it would have for the
majority culture. Such a policy may in fact threaten the very existence of
the minority culture. One might consider, for example, Lyng's discussion
of religion's central role in the cultural life of the various Native American communities.80 The problem with arguments such as these is that
if made too
they cannot be made by mainstream communities-and,
loudly, they might even be opposed by them.
B.

Political Preaching vs. Politically CorrectPreaching

Nowhere is Carter's mainstream focus more apparent than in a chapter called "Political Preaching," in which he criticizes the political activism of some religionists. According to Carter, "political preachers" are
"spiritual leaders who try to explain to their flocks what God wants them
to do in the political world" (p. 70). Carter fully agrees that religion
should inform politics (p. 80). However, in this chapter he complains of
"[t] he seeming unwillingness of politically active religionists to accept the
possibility that their religious traditions might correctly teach a word of
God contrary to their secular predilections" (p. 68).81 Bemoaning the
prevalence of such preachers, Carter notes:
[A]s the servant of politics [,] religion is very much in the public
square....
By calling upon the word of God in service of every
known cause, our society diminishes the weight and the force of
met by the larger community and still does. Conversely,one could argue that political
control such as that exercised by white Protestantsover the society at large provides fertile
ground for what is perceived as a privatizedview of religion where politics and religion
occupy separate spheres. See, e.g., Teitel, supra note 39, at 763 & nn.50-51. A policy that
prohibits any state involvement with religious organizations necessarily embraces the
privatizedmodel, and a model that assumes political power without explanation as to why
it is the appropriatemodel without acknowledgingthat it is based upon an assumption that
there are no significant barriersto cultural integration into the secular world, and without
acknowledging that cultural integration may indeed threaten the existence of some
minority religious communities.
Everydebate about the separation of church and state must begin from a theological
assumption about what religion is. For quite a long time assumptions on the topic have
been based upon a model that is inappropriatefor groups who do not share the attributes
of this country's dominant cultural and religious groups.
80. Calling the case a "conflict between two disparate cultures,"Justice Brennan
noted the inseparabilityof religion from the cultural life of the Native Americans in Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. 439, 459-60, 473 (1988)
(Brennan,J., dissenting). See also Brief for the Indian Respondents, Lyng (No. 86-1013),
availablein LEXIS,Genfed Library,Briefs File; Brief of Amici Curiae National Congress of
American Indians et al., Lyng (No. 86-1013), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library,Briefs
File; see also Vine Deloria, Jr., God is Red: A Native View of Religion 46-217 (1994)
(selected differences between the various Native American traditions andJudeo-Christian
traditions); Loesch, supra note 78, at 360-65 (same).
81. It should be noted that Cartersanctions conservativesand liberals in this chapter
although I would argue that liberals bear the brunt of his criticisms.

1995]

RELIGIOUSFREEDOM

503

religious belief. Indeed, by readily supposing that the word of
God is so malleable that it can (by coincidence) support every
cause that one's politics also happen to support, we undermine
the idea of faith as a source of moral guidance. (P. 80.)82
The problem with political preaching, according to Carter, is that
the political preacher allows politics to guide theology, rather than vice
versa (pp. 67, 70).83 Significantly, Culture concedes that political preachers may be sincere in their proclamations, that they may well "believe that
the political positions they press are the positions that God would want
them to press" (p. 70). But Culture argues that "the political preacher's
sincerity is not enough to save political preaching" (p. 70).
Carter contends that these religionists, i.e., political preachers, hurt
the cause of "restoring religion to the place of honor that it deserves" (p.
68). Indeed, according to Carter, they themselves trivialize religion.
This chapter demonstrates strikingly the inherent inconsistencies in
Carter's approach and the extent to which his views are rooted in cultural
and theological assumptions that are not universally held. In earlier
chapters he has informed us that the devoutly religious have difficulty
separating their religious selves from their public selves (p. 8). But here
he tells us that we should be suspicious when one's politics and one's
theology always match up. In the prior chapters, he has argued that the
religious must be free to dictate their own theology (p. 34). But here he
offers readers what comes across as a litmus test for theologically sound
religious discourse:
Matters become troublesome . . . when one's theology always
ends up squaring precisely with one's politics. At that point,
there is a reason to suspect that far from trying to discern God's
will and follow it in the world, the political preacher is first deciding what path to take in the world and then looking for evidence that God agrees. (P. 70.)84
Lurking behind this statement appears to be an assumption that it is a
universal dictate that one's political views and one's theological views
should occupy completely distinct spheres. As in the case of Culture's discussions of the Lyng and Smith opinions, here again Culture speaks to a
particular theological viewpoint, one that is uniquely mainstream. Cer82. "PoliticalPreaching,"says Carter,is the "flipside" of the trivializationof religion,
but here, the religiously faithful are the trivializers(pp. 67-68). This point suggests that
the trivialization of religion of which Carter originally spoke was being done by the
"nonfaithful,"and seems to conflict with his earlier statement that the faithful are a
majorityin America and even a majorityin Congress and that this majorityis being forced
to abandon its religious self.
83. One wonders whether it is appropriatefor the political to be very religious-but
not for the religious to be very political. Carter recognizes what he describes as a
contemporarytrend in hermeneutics-that interpretersget out of the text only that which
they put into it-Carter rejects the view as too "nihilistic"for the faithful who take divine
guidance seriously, as Carter certainly does (p. 73).
84. Such a view, Cartersays, is problematic because diversityis not acknowledged (p.
71). Incorrect political views are seen as indicating a lack of commitment (p. 71).
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tainly, Carter must be right that religion is serious business. But Carter's
formula for religiously correct discourse is flawed, particularly when applied to those outside the mainstream.
The problem with Carter's approach is strikingly revealed by his casual and haphazard half-sentence reference to liberation theology:
This is the essence of the problem of political preaching, as I
have named the effort to use God's name to bend one's flock to
the correct political view. It is the problem with George Bush's
effort to link God to America's victory in the Cold War, and it is
the problem with much that passes for liberation theology. To insist
that God is, in effect, one of us-that He is our person, instead
not much different from the trivialof we being His people-is
ization inherent in the rather offensive slogan that occasionally
adorns the bumpers of cars from North Carolina, where a minor
form of godhead is conferred upon the University of North Carolina's blue-suited basketball team, the Tar Heels. Says the
bumper sticker, "IF GOD ISN'T A TAR HEEL, THEN WHY IS
THE SKYCAROLINA BLUE?" God, it seems, not only roots for
the right countries and the right ideologies, but for the right
basketball team as well. (Pp. 81-82) (emphasis added.)85
Much that passes for liberation theology? No doubt many of Carter's
readers have not the faintest idea of what liberation theology is. Of
course, now they need not find out because by placing a half-sentence
reference to "much" of it between a politician's empty incantation and a
basketball fan's bumper sticker, Culturetells them that it is not important.
In fact, liberation theology is an umbrella term for a wide-ranging
and varied scheme of theological efforts to refashion the traditional
Eurocentric image of God that has dominated Christian religious discourse and practice. In its various forms, it claims that Christianity's true
essence is the alleviation of suffering and oppression. It also claims that,
contrary to this purpose, traditional religious discourse and doctrine have
been used as instruments of the state, preserving the power structures
within the status quo contrary to God's will.86
The theme of liberation within Christianity has been raised by many.
For example, in Latin America, oppressed communities challenged the
85. Carter'scitation of the ailment with liberation theology-its claim that God is one
of us rather than we are one of God's-would be objected to by many liberation
theologians who would argue that they make both assertions. Furthermore, his frontal
attack on the lighthearted Tar Heels slogan demonstrates the extent to which Cultureis
trapped in Carter's personal vision of what religion ought to be and how the "religious"
ought to conduct themselves, and displaysa revealinglyNortheastern failure to appreciate
the slogan's Southern context.
86. See, e.g., Liberation Theology: A Documentary History xiii-xiv (Alfred T.
Hennelly ed., 1992) ("[L]iberation theology ... integrate[s] ... the struggle for justice as
an essential feature of everymethod, theme, and context of theology ... [ and] unmask[s]
. . . oppressive ... attitudes in both society and the Christianchurches.").
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established religion of the conquerors as employing Christianity as ajustification for oppression.87
In 1971, Peruvian theologian Gustavo Gutierrez explained the phenomenon as it had been revealing itself over a number of years in Latin
America. In so doing, he addressed the concerns of those who argued
that liberation theologians were straying from the language of traditional
theology in their insistence that Christianity had a message about political
life.
To place oneself in the perspective of the Kingdom means to
participate in the struggle for the liberation of those oppressed
by others. This is what many Christians who have committed
themselves to the Latin American revolutionary process have begun to experience. If this option seems to separate them from
the Christian community, it is because many Christians, intent
on domesticating the Good News, see them as wayward and perhaps even dangerous. If they are not always able to express in
appropriate terms the profound reasons for their commitment,
it is because the theology in which they were formed-and
which they share with other Christians-has not produced the
categories necessary to express this option, which seeks to respond creatively to the new demands of the Gospel and of the
oppressed and exploited peoples of this continent.88
But Gutierrez did not believe that the fact that the expressions of
those involved in the struggle for liberation arose out of political need
rendered the theology thus formed invalid.
[I]n their commitments, and even in their attempts to explain
them, there is a greater understanding of the faith, greater faith,
greater fidelity to the Lord than in the 'orthodox' doctrine ...
of reputable Christian circles. This doctrine is supported by authority and much publicized because of access to social communications media, but it is so static and devitalized that it is not
even strong enough to abandon the Gospel. It is the Gospel
which is disowning it.89
In this country, the theme of liberation was also present in Christian
expressions by slave communities deprived of their right to practice ancestral religions.90 As is obvious from a cursory review of his speeches,
87. In Latin America, liberation theology was largely a critique of traditional Roman
Catholic doctrine which was the dominant religious heritage of the conquerors. The
forerunners of formal liberation theology dated back to the time of the Spanish conquest
and its resulting massive enslavement and oppression of Amerindians by conquistadors.
See Liberation Theology, supra note 86, at xvii.
88. Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation:History, Politics and Salvation 203
(Sister Caridad Inda & John Eagleson trans. & eds., 1973). This book is an English
translation of Teoligia de la Liberaci6n Perpectivas (1971).
89. Id.
90. See AlbertJ. Raboteau, Slave Religion 218-19 (1978); GayraudS. Wilmore, Black
Religion and Black Radicalism 37 (1972). The theme of liberation is evident in Negro
spirituals and gospel songs. See, e.g., Lincoln & Mamiya, supra note 79, at 346-81
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the liberation theme is a dominant one in the work of Dr. Martin Luther
King,Jr.91 But the term "liberationtheology"became a term of art in this
country when academic voices adopted the term. The formative voice
was that of James Cone who published Black Theologyand Black Power in

1969, and then, in 1970, his classic work, A BlackTheology
of Liberation.In
1986, he described his approach to writing the latter book:
I was completely unaware of the beginnings of liberation
theology in the Third World, especially in Latin America.
Neither did I know much about the theme of liberation in African-American history and culture. Unfortunately,myformal theological and historical knowledgewas primarily limited to the dominant
perspectivesof North America and Europe [emphasis added]. But,

despite these limitations, I was determined to speak a liberating
word for and to African-AmericanChristians,using the theological resources at my disposal. I did not have time to do the theological and historical research needed to present a "balanced"
perspective on the problem of racism in America. Black men,
women, and children were being shot and imprisoned for asserting their right to a dignified existence. Others were wastingaway
in ghettoes, dying from filth, rats, and dope, as white and black
ministers preached about a blond, blue-eyedJesus who came to
make us all just like him. I had to speak a different word, not
just as a black person but primarilyas a theologian.I felt then, as
I still do, that if theology had nothing to say about black suffering and resistance, I could not be a theologian.92
Cone thus argued, as did Latin American liberation theologians, that
"[t]here can be no Christian theology that is not identified unreservedly
with those who are humiliated and abused."93For Cone, as a black Amer(discussing themes in black religious music). Indeed, FrederickDouglass urged that one
could not be both Christianand a supporterof slavery,and that allegiance to God required
efforts to overthrowslavery. See PennsylvaniaFreedman,Aug. 12, 1847 ("Brethren,Rouse
The Church:"An AddressDelivered in Philadelphia,Penn. on Aug. 6, 1847) and National
Anti-SlaveryStandard, 7 June 1849 ("AnAbolitionist Measure of American Churches and
the Free Soil party:"An Address Delivered in Boston Massachusettson 30 May 1849), in 2
The Frederick Douglass Papers 90, 198 (John W. Blassingameed., 1982).
91. See James H. Cone, Martin Luther King, Jr., Black Theology-BlackChurch, in
Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Civil Rights Movement 409, 412 (DavidJ. Garrow ed.,
1989); Cornel West, Black Theology of LiberationAs Critique of CapitalistCivilization,in
Black Theology, A Documentary History 410; infra note 95 (tracing history of black
theology of liberation and noting King's contribution).
92. James H. Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation: Twentieth AnniversaryEdition
xii (3rd ed. 1990) [hereinafter Cone, A Black Theology]. Cone and other liberation
theologians were influenced by numerous African-Americanpredecessors as well as by
European writers such as German theologians Jfirgen Moltmann and Johannes B. Metz.
See James H. Cone, God of the Oppressed, 126-32 (1975) [hereinafter Cone, God of the
Oppressed].
93. Cone, A Black Theology, supra note 92, at 1. For example, using scripture, Cone
argued that God selected the Israelites to be his people because of their oppressed
condition, and that throughout the Bible, scripture'sprevailingtheme is God meeting the
oppressed and liberating them from their oppression. See id. at 1-4.
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ican who began his quest to redefine theology during the CivilRights era,
the community of the oppressed was epitomized by black America.
Cone's critique was harsh (some might prefer "honest") and sent white
theologians and a considerable number of African-Americanones into
fits.94
Out of these early developments emerged a virtualexplosion of political action, scholarship, and change challenging traditional Eurocentric
notions of Christianityand insisting on revisions to the predominantly
European version of Christianity'shistory and its present purpose. Soon,
other communities that viewed themselves on the underside of political
and theological life in this country began to reexamine the relevance of
traditional western Christian doctrine to their own lives (pp. 77-78).95
Today, there is not a prominent mainstreamseminaryin the country that
does not at least recognize the themes of liberation theology as worthy of
94. Cone has critiqued his own early work, identifying a number of weaknesses,
including a failure to incorporate a gender analysis,a negative overreactionto white racism
(as if "the sole basis for Black Theology were racism among whites"), a failure to
incorporate a social and economic analysis, and a lack of knowledge of the struggles in
Latin America. SeeJames H. Cone, For My People: BlackTheology and the Black Church
78-98 (1985); Cone, A Black Theology, supra note 92, at xv-xix.
95. A sampling of readings under the black theology umbrella (in addition to the
material previouslycited) is found in Black Theology: A Documentary History James H.
Cone & GayraudS. Wilmore eds., 2d ed. 1993) (Two volume set containing writings from
1966 to 1992 and including writingsby African-AmericanWomen. The set also includes an
extensive bibliography).
Writings by African-Americanwomen (sometimes called "Womanist Theology")
include Jacquelyn Grant, White Women's Christ and Black Women's Jesus: Feminist
Christology and Womanist Response (1989); Renita J. Weems, Just a Sister Away: A
WomanistVision of Women's Relationshipsin the Bible (1988); Delores S. Williams,Sisters
in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God-Talk (1993); see also 2 Black
Theology: A Documentary History, supra, at 257-351 (chapter on womanist theology
including works by various womanist writers).
Other American female perspectives include Christian Feminism: Visions of a New
Humanity Judith L. Weidman ed., 1984) (collection of essays by feminist theologians);
MaryDaly, Beyond God The Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women's Liberation (1973)
(feminist Catholic perspective);RosemaryR. Ruether, LiberationTheology: Human Hope
Confronts Christian History and American Power (1972) (a feminist theologian's
perspective on emerging black theology, Latin American liberation theology, and feminist
theology); RosemaryR. Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk:Towarda FeministTheology (10th
Anniv. ed. 1993); Rosemary R. Ruether, Womanguides: Readings Toward a Feminist
Theology (1985).
An excellent sampling of the writings tracing the development of liberation theology
in Latin America is found in LiberationTheology: A DocumentaryHistory,supra note 92.
One can also look under the names of noted Latin American liberation theologians,
including Leonardo Boff (Brazil); Miguez Bonino (Argentina); Paulo Freire (Brazil);
Gustavo Gutierrez (Peru);Juan Luis Segundo (Uruguay);Jon Sobrino (El Salvador). For
other non-American perspectives, see, e.g., Aloysius Pieris, An Asian Theology of
Liberation (1988) (Sri Lanka).
The vast body of scholarly work that falls under the "liberation theology" umbrella,
not to mention pulpit preaching that carries on the liberation tradition, demonstrates the
problems with Culture'sreference.
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study, and many seek to represent the perspectives of liberation theologians on their faculty.96
Carter'scomplaint-that one should be suspicious when politics and
theology match up-cuts to the heart of "political"theology. By contrast,
without apology, James Cone traced the birth of Black Theology directly
to the African-American church's involvement in the Civil Rights
Movement:
When King and other black church persons began to relate the
Christian gospel to the struggle for racial justice in American
society, the great majority of white churches and their theologians denied that such a relationship existed. Conservative
white Christiansclaimed that religion and politics did not mix.
Liberal white Christians,with few exceptions during the 1950s
and early '60s, remained silent on the theme or they advocated
a form of gradualism that denounced boycotts, sit-ins, and freedom rides.97
He continued:
Contraryto popular opinion now, King was not well received by
the white American church establishment when he inaugurated
the civil rights movement with the Montgomery bus boycott in
1955. Because blacks received little or no theological support
from white churches and their theologians (who were preoccupied with Barth, Bultmann, and the death-of-Godcontroversy!),
blacks themselves had to search deeply into their own history in
order to find a theological basis for their priorpoliticalcommitmentto liberate the black poor.98
It would not be hard to see how liberation theologians might view Culture'ssingular reference to liberation theology as an insulting one. The
very brevity of the reference speaks volumes about the focus of Culture.
While Carter says one should be suspicious when politics and religion match up, theologians who see liberation and justice as the essence
96. It should be noted that not every tradition that embraces a liberation theme also
embraces the "liberation theology" label. In the African-Americanchurch, the label is
more easily embraced in the North than in the more conservativechurches of the South.
See Lincoln & Mamiya,supra note 79, at 178-82. However, Lincoln and Mamiyaclaim
that the theme of liberation (or the "prophetic"theme) as demonstrated in the work of
Martin Luther King,Jr. is present to some degree in all predominantlyAfrican-American
churches. See id. at 12. Since Carter references liberation theology as an "ideology"(p.
81), the extent to which his comments on political preaching as a whole would also negate
the less academic tradition of prophetic preaching is unclear. Also, more recent scholarly
manifestationsof black theology have been criticized as far too subdued in their criticisms
when compared to the scholarship of the '60s and '70s. Noting that "[t]he anger of
oppressed young Blacks is conspicuously absent from [much of recent Black theology],"
Cone has asked, "[i]s it because [African-Americanacademic] theologians have moved
into a White academic suburb and thereby have lost touch with ordinarypeople?" James
H. Cone, General Introduction, in 2 Black Theology: A DocumentaryHistory,supra note
95, at 1, 9.
97. Cone, supra note 94, at 7.
98. Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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of Christianity's message and who perceive a diversion away from that
message in traditional mainstream theology might argue that it is when
theology and politics do not match up that one should be suspicious.99
Indeed, did not the theology of Martin Luther King seem always to
square precisely with his politics? Should we then conclude that King
first decided what path to take and then looked for evidence that God
agreed with him? And even if we do so conclude, does that finding invalidate his theology? Carter does not intend to include King in his critique
(pp. 38, 41)-but how does one tell the difference between appropriate
and inappropriate theology?'00
And what of Carter's defense in a prior chapter of Operation Rescue's right to call upon religion as an appropriate basis for political action against abortion (pp. 41, 234)? Why is not that same defense available to liberation theologians who call upon religion as the basis for
social action or to others who Carter lumps together as political preachers? And finally, what of his past cry of trivialization? How can it be justified against his slicing reference to liberation theology or the passage in
Culture that excoriates a young female preacher whose sermon addressed
the civil strife in El Salvador and Nicaragua?'0' It is difficult not to won99. Cone has warned that theology is created by human beings with reference to
particularplaces and times. There is, according to Cone and other liberation theologians,
a truth to be discerned, but the process of discernment is flawed with human error, with
the necessary result that human expressions of theology must often be reassessed and
redefined. See Cone, God of the Oppressed, supra note 92, at 39.
100. Ironically, Carter dismisses the sincerity of the political preacher, but he is
willing to consider sincerity when dealing with Dr. Martin Luther King,Jr. In a different
chapter he states:
CertainlyKing and other religious leaders showed no reluctance to claim for their
positions an "exclusivealignment with the Almighty." Nor is there any reason
that they should have been reluctant, provided that they had come in a prayerful
way to a sincerebeliefthat they had discovered the will of God. (Pp. 48-49)
(emphasis added.)
Of course, one might well ask how Carter or any of us can discern that an admittedly
sincere preacher has not come in a prayerfulwayto the belief that he or she has discovered
the will of God. Compare here Carter's favorable report of the story of white feminist
Gloria Steinem being asked howJudaism led her to feminism and Steinem's reply that it
was the other way around (p. 59).
101. Carter describes in mocking terms a first time visit to a church and a fledgling
female preacher's attempt to deliver a message in which she attempted to tie the political
situation in Nicaraguaand El Salvadorto a vision of God's plan (pp. 69-70). At the time,
both countries were caught in the grip of civil war and the preacher was apparently
suggesting that God favored one side of that conflict. Carter refers to the preacher as "a
sort of left-wing Oliver North," calls her sermon "no masterpiece of coherence," and says,
"She wanted to set us straight on Central America because, she feared, many among us
were misunderstanding God's plan and therefore falling into sin" (p. 69). Having thus
ridiculed the young preacher (for no apparent useful purpose), Carter provides his
readers with a psychological profile informing us that "the preacher in question had no
conception of the possibilityof a faith not guided by her prior political commitments."Says
Carter, "Forher, politics should lead faith . . ." (p. 69). Apparently,this profile was based
upon the twenty minutes or so that Carter listened to the preacher's sermon.
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der whether Carter disagrees with the approach of political preachers
merely because he disagrees with the points of view they espouse.
Carter'sfailure to recognize the difficultyin the passing reference or
in applying his faith formula reflects the same trend present in his discussions of the Smithand Lyng cases. Culture'sfocus is upon the majority
religions and cultures.102 Thus, he ignores the political and social context in which liberation theologians believe they operate. Indeed, when
liberation theology is stripped of its cultural and political context - as in
the case of Smithand Lyng- something significant is lost in the translapolitical and cultural context - that
tion. And it is this something
Carter repeatedly ignores.
It is this mainstream focus that leads Carter to slip into criticizing
approaches that differ from the Eurocentric model of what "preaching"
should be. Certainly, the question that Cultureposes is not which theology is rightor which theology is politically correct. Rather, Carter purports to argue for maximum freedom for sincere religionists to speak
about God. He concedes that many political preachers are sincere. If the
question is access to the public square, then the theology of these liberation theologians-or of other sincere political preachers-deserves no
less respect than Carter'sown theology.
Thus, Carter accomplishes in his chapter on "Political Preaching"
something curiously similar to that for which he criticizes liberals
throughout the rest of his book. He argues against the use of certain
God-talkin the public square becauseit is God-talk.'03He imposes a standard that restrictspublic religious expressions to particulartopics. These
are odd statements in a book whose theme is the celebration of public
discourse about religion. Carter's vigorous attack on liberals in prior
chapters is interesting irony in light of his willingness to equate the claims

102. Consider the words of Alistair Kee concerning Christian theology that bears a
political message:
[T]he most obvious characteristicof political theology is that it is biased. For
most of its history theology has been biased toward the political right: nor was
this challenged. Political theology is biased toward the left: why should that be
challenged? But there is more to it than a simple choosing of political allegiance.
In the gospels Jesus is biased towardsthe left: he takes his place with those who
are certainlynot the king's men. He associateswith the poor and despised rather
than with the rich and influential.... He takes sides apparentlybecause God has
taken sides....

Political theology is biased because Jesus was biased.

AlistairKee, Preface to A Political Reader in Theology xi (AlistairKee ed., 1974). Cornel
West has cited BlackTheology's claim that God is aligned with the oppressed as one of the
most positive aspects of BlackTheology. See Cornel West, BlackTheology of Liberationas
a Critique of CapitalistCivilization,in 2 Black Theology: A Documentary History, supra
note 95, at 410, 416.
103. It cannot be that only a fellow religionist has standing to issue critiques of the
religious and that therefore Carter has unique standing.
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of liberation theologians to a claim that God supports the New York
Mets.'04
In short, Culture evinces a tendency to view the world solely through
the lens of the dominant groups in our religious and political culture,
while purporting to represent the interests of all. Unfortunately, that
lens automatically brings to the foreground those images that are consistent with and affirming of the dominant group's life experiences. At the
same time, the lens merges into the background all images that are foreign to and critical of the dominant group's perspective. Using this lens,
Culture is far too preoccupied with not offending the sensibilities of liberals and conservatives in the book-buying marketplace to help its audience
appreciate the legal compromises that must be obtained when balancing
rights in a diverse culture. Thus, Cultureplays to a mainstream audience
eager to champion their own causes-and to blame external forces for
their woes-but far less willing to conduct self-examination or to confront the difficult issues that underlie debates over the proper line of
separation between church and state.
IV.

CULTURAL MYTHS AND TELEPHONE FAITH

In earlier sections I noted the weakness of Culture's dominant
the religious are prohibited from engaging in God-talk in
theme-that
the public square. I also noted that to strengthen its case, Culture resorted to trivializing the law and inadvertently, to trivializing religious traditions that are outside its own vision of what religion should be.
In this section, I further address the problems with the theme, considering as examples two myths that Culture uses to support its theory of
exclusion. The myths are 1) that in the past, liberals embraced the Civil
Rights Movement and that now they engage in hypocrisy when they criticize conservatives' God-talk; and 2) that today the religionist is treated
worse than other previously excluded groups in the public square. I argue that these myths confirm the reality of a particular slice of America,
but that close examination reveals that they are problematic as a basis for
a formula to preserve religious freedom because they do not incorporate
104. Interestingly enough, in the footnotes at the end of the book, Carter cites the
work of some feminist theologians as he discussesinternal battles over the status of women
in the Episcopal church. He does not identify these persons to his readers as "liberation
theologians," but he accepts some of these scholars' challenges to the traditional
interpretationsof the Biblicalbook of Genesis that ascribe hierarchyof Adam over Eve. At
the same time, Carter argues that other scriptural passages are not so easily subject to
reinterpretation (pp. 289-91 & n.l). Since most view feminist theology as fitting under
the liberation theology umbrella, see supra note 95, one might ask why Carterdid not take
more care to link the references. It is also signficiant that Carterwas willing to devote a
page-and-a-halflong footnote to illuminating his discussion of the majority's gender
critiques of the Christianchurch but very little time to the racial and class critiques of the
church's approaches that other liberation theologians have made. I do not ascribe any ill
intent on his part, but I view it as just another example of his focus, which reflects the
perspective and interests of the majority.
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the perspectives of minority groups. I demonstrate again that Culture
continues a trend of defining a particularvision of the world-the vision
of the majority-as a universal truth.
Secondly, I consider an inherent conflict within the trivializationthesis: that the faithful care about religion, but they do not express their
faithfulness in public. I argue that a theory of religious freedom that
hangs upon this precipice raises dangerous concerns for both law and
religion.
A. CulturalMyths
Cultureuses the Civil Rights Movement to buttress the argument that
we have moved awayfrom God-talk. It claims that liberals embraced the
religious rhetoric of the Civil Rights Movement (pp. 60, 64-65, 227-30),
an observation that enables Carter to argue that liberals are now being
inconsistent when they complain about conservativeGod-talk. The claim
of liberal embrace is presented as if it is a well accepted truth in need of
no substantiation (pp. 60, 64-65, 227-30). Of course, whether or not
one accepts Carter's point as gospel depends on one's perspective.
Carter restrictsthe religious language in the movement to the early moderate approach of King. Even in hindsight, one must admit a far different
reaction to the religious language found in the arguments of the Black
Muslims, or even to Christianapproaches like James Cone's.'05 There is
another less laudatoryview of white liberal receptiveness to religious language within the movement and to its message.'06
105. In fact, Malcolm X argued that the credit for white liberal acceptance of the
language of blacks perceived as moderate goes to black nationalists whose views they
rejected and feared. See, e.g., Malcolm X, Speech at Corn Hill Methodist Church,
Rochester, New York, February16, 1965, in Malcolm X: The Last Speeches 173 (Bruce
Perry ed., 1989).
One might wonder why the distinction between "toleration"and "respect"that Carter
insisted upon in earlier chapters,see supra note 14, is not drawnupon as Carterclaims that
liberal whites hypocriticallyaccepted civil rights religious language. In other words, was
the alleged liberal acceptance mere tolerance or was it the "respect"that Carter earlier
insisted upon? And if it was only tolerance, then how is that approach inconsistent with
the alleged treatment of conservativereligioniststoday? In both cases, the value of religion
is measured by its usefulness as a tool for secular service.
106. Martin Luther King, Jr. himself often complained that the white liberals or
moderates were not supporting the movement in significant enough numbers.
For example, in 1964 he noted the silence of "moderate"and "decent" whites in
Birmingham. See Martin Luther King,Jr., Why We Can't Wait, in A Testament of Hope:
The EssentialWritingsOf Dr. MartinLuther King,Jr. 518, 528 (JamesM. Washington,Jr.
ed., 1986) [hereinafter Testament of Hope]. He also noted the "estrangement"of white
liberals from the movement and a paternalismthat made them uncomfortablewith playing
a secondary role. See Martin Luther King,Jr., A Testament of Hope, in Testament of
Hope, supra, at 313, 316. Of white northern liberals he complained:
[T]here is a dire need today for a liberalism that is truly liberal. What we are
witnessing today in so many northern communities is a sort of quasi liberalism
which is based on the principal of looking sympatheticallyat all sides .... It is a
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Even if one were to agree with Carter'sversion of history, the claim
of hypocrisy by liberals falters for yet another reason. It is indisputable
that the language of the Civil Rights Movement was not exclusively religious. Indeed, King and others used boththe secular language of reason
and religious authority to make their arguments, even though, certainly,
in King's private view, the religious mandate alone was sufficient. King
frequently cited secular reasons for the outcomes he sought and often
relied upon the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence and
other acts of the state as support for his cause.'07 The language of the
liberalismthat is so objectivelyanalyticalthat it is not subjectivelycommitted. It is
a liberalism which is neither hot nor cold but lukewarm.
MartinLuther King,Jr., Give Us The Ballot - We Will TransformThe South, in Testament
of Hope, supra, at 197, 199.
In his Letter from a Birmingham Jail, King responded to an open letter from
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish clerics in Birmingham calling on blacks to cease their
peaceful demonstrations and to obey the police and the courts. See Birmingham News,
April 13, 1963, at 2. Although he noted that he rarelyresponds to criticism, he indicated
that he was responding in this case because he believed the writersto be "men of genuine
good will." King expressed his anguish over those who complained that civil rights
questions were "social issues with which the gospel has no real concern." Martin Luther
King,Jr., Letter from a BirminghamCityJail,in Testament of Hope, supra, at 289, 299. He
stated further:
In the midst of blatant injustices inflicted upon the Negro, I have watched white
churches stand on the sideline and merely mouth pious irrelevancies and
sanctimonious trivialities.
*

*

*

I have traveled the length and breadth of Alabama,Mississippiand all the other
southern states .... Over and over again I have found myself asking: "Whatkind
of people worship here? Who is their God?["]
*

*

*

Yes, I see the church as the body of Christ. But, oh! How we have blemished and
scarred [the body of Christ] through social neglect and fear of being
nonconformists.
*

*

*

The contemporary church is often a weak, ineffectual voice with an uncertain
sound. It is so often the arch-supporter of the status quo. Far from being
disturbed by the presence of the church, the power structure of the average
community is consoled by the church's silent and often vocal sanction of things as
they are.
Id. at 299-300.
King certainly acknowledged that there were outstanding examples of whites who
offered aid in the struggle, but the large majorityof liberals and moderates seemed either
uninterested or unwilling to risk the ostracismthat would follow from open support of the
movement.
107. See, e.g., MartinLuther King,Jr., I Have a Dream, in Testament of Hope, supra
note 106, at 217 (referring to the Constitutionand Declarationof Independence as part of
"apromissorynote to which everyAmericanwas to fall heir"and noting a "dreamthat one
day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed-we hold these truths
to be self-evident, that all men are created equal").
King was indeed fortunate that he shared in common with the founding fathers a
religious concept of a creator that permitted him to manipulate the secular language of
reason so that it confirmed the values in the language of his religion-and that he had the
talent to perform this translation. Would one whose culture or religious tradition diverged
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Civil Rights Movement was not, then, exclusively religious language,
although it was heavily religious. An assumed liberal acceptance of Civil
Rights religious language does not prove or disprove the case for acceptance of arguments based on religious authority alone.
Another cultural myth is found in the argument that the religionist is
treated worse than other groups in terms of access to the public square.
Here Cultureappears to create a hypothetical generic religious person.
Then, Carterasks us to compare that person's freedom to speak with the
freedom experienced by other groups.
If [a public] school's teachings are offensive to you because you
are gay or black or disabled, the chances are that the school will
at least give you a hearing and, if it does not, that many liberals
will flock to your side and you will find a sympathetic ear in the
media. But if you do not like the way the school talks about
religion, or if you believe that the school is inciting your children to abandon their religion, you will probably find that the
media will mock you, the liberal establishment will announce
that you are engaged in censorship, and the courts will toss you
out on your ear. (P. 52.)
Either Cultureis speaking only to white, nondisabled, heterosexual religionists or Carter actually believes that this question is an easy call.'08
The request that I, as an African-Americanreligious person, weigh my
to a greater degree from that of the mainstream(or one with less talent than King) be able
to find a similar secular or religious translationalhook?
Interestingly, with respect to the hypocrisy claim, John Rawls argues in Political
Liberalism,published after Culturewent to press, that his theory of liberalism would not
eliminate the heavily religious discourse of the civil rights or abolition movements from
public debates. SeeJohn Rawls,Political Liberalism250 (1993). Religious language would
be acceptable to the extent that it affirmed public values of justice. Rawls states that
abolitionists who argued on religious grounds against the institution of slavery"supported
the clear conclusions of public reason" as found in principles of justice. Id. at 249-50.
According to Rawls,the same is true of the language of Martin Luther King,Jr. "except
that King could appeal-as the abolitionistscould not-to the political values expressed in
the Constitution correctly understood." Id. at 250. "Religiousdoctrines clearly underlie
King'sviewsand are important in his appeals. Yet they are expressed in general terms;and
they fully support constitutional values in accord with public reason." Id. at 250 n.39.
Carter might still complain that Rawls'sapproach places religious autonomy at the
mercy of secular predisposition. On the other hand, Carter clearly concedes a need to
curb some religious behavior that is determined to have a negative societal impact (p. 30).
108. At a different point in Culture,Carteracknowledges that, despite the "cultureof
disbelief,"African Americans are quite open in their religious declarations (p. 60).
Carter deals with this paradox with the vague suggestion that liberals (read whites?)
have a "blind spot" when it comes to the religiosityof AfricanAmericans (p. 60) and that
the media accept God-talkfrom personalities they "like"such as Jesse Jackson or Martin
Luther King,Jr. (pp. 59-60). But why must we credit liberal permissionto speak and not
minority group insistenceon speaking? Without liberal permission would Martin Luther
King,Jr. have given up on citing God and begun quoting TheNew YorkTimesinstead? Is it
possible that white God-talkis so new a public phenomenon that what some religionistssay
they are experiencing now is simply another revolutionaryprocess in which a group that
desires to speak has to insist on being heard?
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freedom as a black person against my freedom as a religious person is a
curious one. That these passages gave me pause tells me that my balancing act, even if I could perform it, would not result in the outcome Carter
declares.'09 Moreover, if there was a purpose to these comparisonsother than arguing that the white religionist has less access to the public
square than members of these groups-it
was not obvious to this
reader." 0 In another context, Carter warns that while it is appropriate to
speak of oppression as being unique, and therefore in demand of different solutions, "we enact a terrible threat to unity of humanity when we
construct a hierarchy of suffering, by arguing that one oppression is
109. My reaction is triggered by Carter's obviously intentional choice to take a
comparative approach in his diversityarguments and to blur the key distinctions, rather
than permit the majority's case to stand on its own. The essence of his argument is
captured in his statement that "people whose contribution to the nation's diversitycomes
from their religious traditionsare not valued unless their voices are somehow esoteric" (p.
57). He offers the Robertscase as an example of what he means:
One thinks, for example, of the Colorado school district . .. that ordered, with
federal approval that the Bible and books on Christianitybe removed from a
classroom, while books on Native American religious traditions-and for that
matter, on the occult-were allowed to remain. (P. 57.)
"Esoteric"is not defined, but I presume that Carter means a voice that differs from that
usually associated with the cultural and religious mainstream.
Also revealing is the following comment:
[C]onsider the fact that for all the calls for diversityin the hiring of university
faculty, one rarely hears such arguments in favor of the devoutly religious-a
group, according to surveydata, that is grosslyunderrepresented on campus. (P.
57) (footnote omitted.)
Carterseems to attempt to advance the ball for mainstreamreligionists by suggesting
that their views ought also to be viewed as "diverse". From the perspective of minority
groups, it would seem that he suggests that if the reason for recognizing the faiths of
minority groups is merely because they are different from the mainstream-and not
because they are religious-we somehow trivializethe religious content of the recognized
speech. In this way, Carter shoehorns the minority experience into the majority model
(disproving once again his claim that the mere presence of religiosity alwaysdisqualifies
speech). The questionable proposition underlying this is that providing special treatment
for mainstream religious speech will result in a net increase in respect for minority
religious speech, or at least not be detrimental to the various interests of minority faiths
and cultures.
Culturegives only superficialrecognition to the contextual nature of religious freedom
in a pluralistic society. Moreover, it does not explain how a state recognizing a minority
religion for reasons of its contribution to diversitywithin the culture might go further to
recognize the "religiosity"of that religion without running afoul of promoting a particular
faith or, for that matter, how more recognition of the viewsassociatedwith the mainstream
would result in a fairer juggling of all faith group rights, minority and majority alike.
Moreover, in a political context, Carter'sanalysismight suggest that state action supportive
of minority religions for pluralismreasons would have to be matched by a similareffort on
behalf of the dominant religious groups who make the same pluralismclaims. Again, such
an approach ignores the important differences between the majority'sand the minority's
access to power as well as the obvious argument that since they control the culture, the
mainstream necessarily is already included-and indeed control their own degree of
inclusion-to a far greater extent than other groups.
110. Was gender omitted for fear of offending the wrong group?
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worse than another" (p. 95). In light of these observations, Carter's comparisons here are odd.
As best I can discern, the reason that Culture goes astray here is the
same reason that its discussions of the Smith and Lyng opinions failed and
the same reason that it so casually treated the subject of liberation theology. Culture's "objective" model is the experience of white America and
mainstream religionists. From that model, it attempts to extract universal
principles, utilizing assumptions that are heavy in mainstream appeal but
featherweight in logic or scholarly support. The unfortunate result is that
though subject to some criticism, each side of the white mainstream gets
a reward in Culture. White liberals can bask in the glory of theircivil rights
accomplishments and conservatives can moan that King had help from
liberals but they have no one. Meanwhile, important viewpoints lie trampled in their service."' Personally, I am convinced that the white mainstream religionist does not stand alone in the shadow of the public
square. Indeed, Culture's own careful dance around the issues of race
and culture provides the clearest evidence against its own argument of an
open public square on such issues. While Culture's assumptions may well
be palatable to picket fence readers, they raise suspicions that Culturehas
weighed more heavily the political sensitivities and buying power of the
majority than the importance of a thoughtful and inclusive debate on its
central theme.
At the risk of sounding more harsh than I mean to, I cannot help but
confess that when the packaging is discarded, Culturelooks curiously like
a pitch for an affirmative action plan for white mainstream religionists,
the need for which completely escaped this reader. If the point of view of
this group is so grossly underrepresented as Carter suggests, it would be
helpful to have more of that viewpoint represented in public debates.
But if they're out there, I cannot understand why they just don't speak
up. If the recent public political activity of conservative Christians constitutes their speaking up, why then, is Carter complaining that they cannot
speak? If religionists as a group face economic barriers to making themselves heard and to being included in society as do many of the other
111. Culture's use of mainstream assumptions as its starting point is particularly
troublesome to those who don't share those assumptions. The majority as a group has the
power to transform a particular observation reflecting its own group perspective into what
is perceived as universal truth among most within the culture, irrespective of whether the
observation is based on reliable information or research and irrespective of the fact that
the observation does not take into account perspectives of those outside that majority.
These assumptions need not be proven to be viewed as universal truths; they are
legitimized by the fact that (1) they reflect the majority's perspective, which is the
dominant one, and therefore, most within the majority (and those who identify with the
majority) have never thought to question them; (2) the small number of persons within
the majority who have questioned whether their own perspective is correct would rather
devote their energies to topics that affirm rather than challenge their reality; and (3) the
minority as a group does not have the resources to formulate or to launch an effective
rebuttal. These assumptions are often translated into law and public policy.
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groups to which Carter so casually compares them, I am not aware of
these barriers.
Religious speech is different. Indeed, it is for that reason I believe
that significant danger lurks behind Carter's complaint. As I argue below, it is exactly because religious speech is different from other speech
that appeals for public approval must be viewed very skeptically by those
who take religion or law seriously.

B.

Faith
Telephone

There is an internal inconsistency in Culture's thesis that should be
obvious to anyone not intoxicated by the praise that immediately followed its publication. Relying largely on self-identification surveys, Carter
repeatedly reminds us of the much-heralded religiosity of Americans:
"strong majorities of [Americans] tell pollsters that their religious beliefs
are of great importance to them in their daily lives" (p. 4); "better than
nine out of ten Americans believe in God," "some four out of five pray
regularly" (p. 149); and "[a]s many as 82 percent of Americans believe
Hell to be a real place" (p. 137). Moreover, Cultureinforms us that religiosity is not limited to those outside the political elite. Says Carter, "unless
we dismiss as hypocritical cynics the entire Congress of the United
States," we should believe the over 90% of members of Congress who "say
that they consult their religious beliefs before voting on important matters" (pp. 111, 240). Indeed, Carter says, "[w] e are one of the most religious nations on earth, in the sense that we have a deeply religious citizenry" and moreover, "religion matters to people, and matters a lot" (pp.
4, 8).112 Thus, on the one hand, we are to believe that the majority of
Americans are religiously faithful (pp. 4, 8, 20).113 On the other hand,
we are to believe that we do not hear much from that majority in public
because the "culture" discourages them from being themselves. If only
society would change, the story goes, this faithful majority would publicly
proclaim their presence and purpose without fear and America would be
all the better for it.
But this picture is difficult to square with logic or faith. If the faithful
are a majority, then who is silencing them? Following Carter's thesis to its
inevitable conclusions, either the majority is caught in a cycle of self-contradiction and self-hatred or the majority is following lock-step, a small,
unidentified, sacrilegious elite as if entranced. Are we asked to believe
that a mainstream majority with a mandate from an authority they deem
112. Carter's figures come primarily from George Gallup, Jr. & Jim Castelli, The
People's Religion: American Faith in the 90's (1989) and George Gallup,Jr. & SarahJones,
100 Questions and Answers: Religion in America (1989). Sometimes Carter uses the
phrase "tens of millions" in describing the devout (pp. 15, 67).
113. I accept Carter's implicit assertion that faith is a universal concept that has a
consistent meaning, i.e., commitment throughout religious cultures. However, in terms of
how faith is demonstrated, contextually speaking, his conclusions about faith are rooted in
both Christian and majoritarian assumptions.
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higher than the Supreme Court declines to speak or act for fear that
people might ridicule them or not take them seriously?"14
Culture'sargument-that the faithful do not speak because religious
speech is viewed as unacceptable-has a dangerous underlying premise:
that faithfulness should be determined by secular rules. At the slightest
incremental increase in inconvenience, the balance tilts in favor of blaming someone else for the faithful's failure to acknowledge their sentience
in public."15Proceeding on this premise, Cultureundermines what could
have been its most important contribution to the religion debate. That
contribution would have been that religion matters.But how can anyone
seriously say that a faith that cannot withstandverbal opposition "matters"
to its adherents? How can such a "faith"sincerely claim, as Culturedoes,
distinction from "ordinary"speech under the First Amendment?"16
Moreover, the numberof religious persons is not relevant to Culture's
analysis. In other words, if the numbers of religiously devout are actually
lower than Carter suggests, even much lower, theoretically speaking,
would their rights to religious freedom under the Constitution be any less
important? But without serving up such numbers, would Carter have
been able to get a broader public's attention?
By buying into marketplace economics, Cultureavoids facing some
hard facts. The first is that now that religion and the state have been
disentangled, now that the state does not compel or explicitly encourage
a particular faith choice, or even a faith choice at all, large numbers of
114. Carter himself notes, "Anyone who believes deeply is a potential martyr, for
belief alwaysentails a bedrock principle that will not yield" (p. 42).
115. For aJudeo-Christianview, see, e.g., Exodus 16:28 ("'How long will you refuse
to keep my commands and my instructions?'"); Exodus 20:3 ("'You shall have no other
Gods before me.' "); Leviticus 26:14-46 (punishment that will come to Israel for
disobedience); Psalm 81:13-14 (" 'If my people would but listen to me, if Israel would
follow my ways, how quickly would I subdue their enemies.

. .

.' "); Jeremiah 2:1-25

(lamenting Israel's abandonment of God); Mark7:8 ("'You have let go of the commands
of God and are holding on to the traditionsof men.' "); Luke 9:26 (" 'If anyone is ashamed
of me and my words, the Son of Man will be ashamed of him when he comes in his glory
and in the glory of the Fatherand of the holy angels.' "); Luke 12:9 (" 'But he who disowns
me before men will be disowned before the angels of God.' "); 2 Timothy 1:8 ("'So do not
be ashamed to testify about our Lord. .

.

.' ") (New International).

116. Even the polls relied upon by Carter, which are, of course, dominated by
participantsadhering to white mainstreamfaiths, raise similarquestions. For example, 100
Questionsand Answers:Religionin Americanoted that of the Christiansor Jews polled, only
four in ten reported attending religious servicesregularly. See Gallup &Jones, supra note
112, at 72, 120. While one could argue that attendance should not be a litmus test, such
evidence certainly would support a conclusion of religiosity. Furthermore, the authors
reported that knowledge of the Bible among self-described Christian participants was
"meager."Id. at 42 (only 42% could name five of the ten commandments, only 46% could
name first four gospels in New Testament and only 42% knew that Jesus delivered the
Sermon on the Mount). In 1987, only 18% of Americans across age and sex lines were
willing to state that the term "religiousperson"was a perfect description of themselves. Id.
at 182. One must be careful not to overlook the questions raised by such inconsistencies.
See id. at 42.
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the mainstream faithful who holler out "religious!"in privateresponses to
computer-generated telephone calls strike a secular pose in public when
not accompanied by a crowd. These telefaithfuljettison religion publicly
and sometimes privately in the face of opposition or inconvenience.
Given a choice between the rewards of "Godliness"and the rewards of
worldliness, the telefaithful are in a quandary. They want both."17 That
choice is the religious person's right, indeed, that right is protected by
the First Amendment, but each such choice narrows any practical distance that exists between religious speech and other speech. One cannot
claim in private that religion matters, act in public as if it does not, and
then blame the culture for one's transgressions. In the end, it is not the
culture of disbelief that Carter describes but rather the culture of
comfort."18

On the other hand, it would be wrong to charge publicly faithful
religionists with vicarious liability for how the telefaithful behave.
Whether or not liberals previously accepted God-talk does not matter.
Whether the number of the publicly religious is two thousand or two hundred million should not matter. They have a right to speak. But that
right does not preclude opposition and, certainly where mainstream
faiths are concerned, much of what Carter defines as trivializationis, in
117. At least two studies published about the same time as Culturehave suggested in
the face of criticism that claims of religiosity are poor predictors of practice. A research
group from New York University tested the oft-reported thesis that 40% of Americans
attend church weekly, comparing claims against actual attendance. They concluded that
among Protestants and Catholics church attendance is roughly one-half of the levels
reported by Gallup and other polls. See C. Kirk Hadawayet al., What the Polls Don't
Show: A Closer Look At U.S. Church Attendance, 58 Am. Soc. Rev. 741, 742, 748 (1993).
Focusing on one Ohio county for Protestants and 18 Catholic dioceses, the NYU study
lacked the geographical diversity that would provide assurance of the national
applicability;nevertheless, the authors viewed the uniformity of the results found in the
selected areas as significant. See id. at 750.
A second recently published study surveying4,001 Americans concluded that, using
fairly stringent tests, only about 19% of adult Americans regularlypractice their religion.
In evaluating Protestants, for example, the study considered church attendance,
membership in denominations, frequency of prayer,belief in life after death, and ranking
of the importance of religion in their lives. The study also found that levels of religious
commitment made a difference in viewpoints on moral issues but resulted in less
differences in social issues. See Kenneth L. Woodward,The Rites of Americans,Newsweek,
Nov. 29, 1993, at 80, 82.
Hadaway,Marlerand Chaves noted "socialdesirability"factors as one possible reason
for the wide gap found in reporting and attendance. "Ifsurveyrespondents view regular
church activityas normativeor view infrequent church attendance as deviant, they may be
inclined to overreport their attendance." Hadawayet al., supra, at 748-49. They noted a
parallel to the inflation found in self-identification studies on voting. Habitually, the
number of persons who identify themselves as having voted significantlyoutdistances the
number that in fact did vote. See id.
118. Arguably, many members of minority groups would also take a less active
approach to religion if their secular situation was transformed such that they were
comfortablyand securelyassimilatedas a group into the majorityand supported as a group
by the state.
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the case of mainstream groups, simply the expression of an opposing
point of view. The religious are not suffering a special oppression.
Rather, they finally have something in common with other "minority"
groups who seek to redefine the dominant language of the public square.
However, unlike many of the other groups, mainstream religionists possess the cultural integration and the economic and political resources
(and Carter even claims the numbers) to make their dreams a reality.
What is the point of Culture?
Culture missed a great opportunity to emphasize for us that it is no
coincidence that increased recognition of our religious and cultural diversity has been accompanied by increased challenges to what had been
traditionally accepted as legitimate government accommodation of mainstream faith practices. Religion, race and culture are inseparable. The
religions, like other groups in society, bear the burdens and reap the benefits of the hierarchy of human beings that is our past and present as a
nation. Historically, religious groups whose religious and secular needs
were protected by the state perceived no need to rock the political boat.
Their members celebrated a private faith made possible by a state that
provided them comfort and affirmed their reality, often excluding the
reality of others. Thus, they labeled religious activity that challenged that
state as "politics" and not "'religion."'"19It is, in fact, this ongoing relationship with the state that has led one Native American commentator to
claim that "without a favored position in the secular world and its political and economic structures, most of what we now know as American
Christianity would not and could not exist."120
Had market forces not been so compelling, Culture might also have
suggested that while the "religious" are waiting for someone to tell them
where their "freedom" to engage in God-talk in public went, they might
scan a page from the histories of those groups that have not had and still
do not have the political capital to make their speech, religious or otherwise, "convenient" in the public square-or those whose right to speak,
religious or otherwise, was not included among the religious freedoms
that the "Founding Fathers" sought to protect-or
of those within the
mainstream, who do not view convenience-or
permission-as a prerequisite to God-talk. It might have suggested that what the religiously devout are experiencing now is not the defining moment in the history of
American religious discourse; at best, it is merely another minute among
millions of minutes. Had Culture done this, perhaps then, both the
119. Thus, one commentator has argued that many in the religious community have
forgotten that neither politicians nor constitutional lawyersimposed the separation model
on churches. Rather, it was derived from preconstitutional religious traditions. The
current discomfort with the church/state balance is, "in great part, an attack on their
earlier vision of a privatized religious life and attitude of 'forbearance' - or withdrawal
from the political sphere." Teitel, supra note 39, at 763 (footnote omitted). The notable
exceptions were the abolitionists and civil rights movements. See id.
120. Deloria, supra note 80, at 216. This is an updated version of Deloria's classic
work. See Vine Deloria,Jr., God Is Red 245 (1973).
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telefaithful and the publicly faithful, who find consolation in Carter's
book, might have discovered that the resurrection of religious freedom
begins where the need for secular approval of such speech comes to an
end. Culture suggests that religions cannot perform their necessary functions within a democracy unless they are independent of the state and
resisting. But if those in the religious and cultural mainstream cannot be
faithful without approval from the larger society, then they are neither
independent nor resisting.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A key point Cultureurges is that attacks on religious speech are based
upon the fact that the speech is religious, rather than upon disagreement
with the viewpoint expressed. But Culture offers precious little evidence
to support this claim. While complaining about an elite that silences religious discourse, ironically, in the end, Culture fails by virtue of its own
elitism.
But can nothing in this Culturebe saved? The one useful point that
does emerge from Cultureis the seriousness of the injury to the individual
and to society at large when one is prohibited from pursuing the tenets of
one's faith. While Culture's attempt to explain the uniqueness of the religious commitment should be applauded, its mainstream focus leaves us
wondering what an attempt at a truly inclusive analysis might look like. I
do not suggest that I know the answer to that question. Every scholar's
analysis is both driven and limited by her own experiences and the extent
to which, by choice or by necessity, she has been exposed to the experiences of those different from herself.
This fact is an important concern for scholars who would shun the
position that viewpoints should be ignored if they are not held by the
dominant group.'2' When isolated members from a minority group find
acceptance within majority culture, their degree of acceptance is very
much tied to their willingness and ability to assimilate and to accept the
preconstructed assumptions. The same culture that frowns on white
mainstream dissent from that reality greatly rewards minorities who can
affirm the approach of extrapolating its constructed reality onto minority
culture.
I would contend that a scholarly approach to problem-solving (as
opposed to a political one) requires that one take seriously the effect of
policies arising out of majority assumptions of minority rights. The result
121. Cultural and political dissent, whether religious or otherwise, often challenges
the self-affirming reality created by the relevant majority and a recognition of the worth of
a particular dissent requires listeners in the dominant group willing to make themselves
individually uncomfortable in exchange for a perceived larger good that might flow from a
listening.
In both its observations and its omissions, Culture underscores the need to have a
critical masss of scholars from nonmainstream races and cultures in a position to
contribute effectively to debates on our constitutional freedoms.
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of such an approach does not have to be acceptance of what might be
revealed as a distinctively minority position, but it cannot help but result
in a truer understanding of the compromises involved and the effect of
the choices made. In no area is such an approach more important than
the First Amendment-unless,
ultimately, we really do believe that individual constitutional rights assured by the Constitution should be determined by whomever has the most power.
Stephen Carter's perspective is certainly as legitimate for him as
mine is for me. It is indeed, refreshing to find an African-American
scholar who has managed to escape the majority's stereotypical limitations on writing by African Americans.
And so, in the end, both the legal and the faithful must reject the
explanation for the current status of public discourse about religion that
Cultureputs forth. Certainly, a part of me would actually like to believe
much of what Culturesays about the religious devotion of Americans as a
whole. The picture it paints, of an America that takes its religion seriously, held captive by a culture that so grossly trivializes religious devotion
that even stout-hearted people do not dare declare their faith, is very inviting. Such a story, if true, would comfortably explain to me those times
in which the world-famous religiosity of Americans does not manage to
make its way into public discourse or public policy. Even my own secular
missteps in a personal journey of faith could be shined up and displayed
proudly in a new light. A part of me would like to believe that what Stephen Carter says about America is true. But I do not believe it. Not for
one minute. For me, the most convincing evidence that Culturedoes little to advance the ball beyond where we are is its amazing popularity,
despite its gaping logical chasms. We are conformists looking for easy,
convenient, answers. The Cultureof Disbeliefgives us just that.

